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Christine Suzanne Davik* 
ABSTRACT 
In March, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its highly-anticipated 
decision in Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 
which resolved a split among U.S. Courts of Appeals concerning the point in 
time when a copyright owner is first able to file suit against an alleged infringer.  
While at first glance this case may merely appear to be a simple issue of statutory 
interpretation, namely whether it is upon application for registration or once a 
determination has been made on registration by the U.S. Copyright Office, this 
Article argues this decision is a clarion call for a much-needed amendment to 
the Copyright Act.  Although the Court may have correctly construed the 
registration prerequisite in Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act, this Article 
argues that neither of the two approaches before the Court was a truly 
appropriate option.  Alternatively, this Article proffers the requirement of 
infringement must be removed entirely to properly account for technological 
changes in the methods and speed by which copyrightable works are now 
created, reproduced, and distributed.  This will ensure that all copyright owners 
are able to access the courthouse without delay, in accord with virtually every 
other area of law. 
Unfortunately, as it currently stands post-Fourth Estate, most U.S. 
copyright owners cannot seek relief immediately upon detecting infringement of 
their work.  Instead, they must wait months and in some cases years for the 
Copyright Office to complete its review, despite the existence of federal copyright 
protection that attaches automatically upon creation of the work.  As such, the 
author of an unregistered work is left with a right to prevent copyright 
infringement but an inability to do so.  Adding to the inequities of this situation 
is the fact that due to treaty obligations prohibiting formalities that stand in the 
way of enforcing one’s copyright rights, owners of foreign works do not have to 
comply with this registration prerequisite.  Instead, these owners can proceed 
directly to federal court to protect their works.   
Accordingly, this Article advocates for complete removal of the registration 
prerequisite.  In doing so, this Article stands in stark contrast to the recent 
scholarly trend in the field of copyright law advocating for more, not fewer, 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law.  Many thanks to the 
participants at the Texas A&M University School of Law Intellectual Property 
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Christine Dulac and Maureen Quinlan for their exceptional research assistance. 
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formalities associated with one’s copyright rights.  This includes calls by many 
legal scholars for the “re-incentivization” of federal registration by taking away 
certain rights and the availability of particular defenses as a consequence for 
failing to seek an earlier copyright registration.  While many of these proposals 
are an understandable reaction to the significant increase in both the breadth 
and depth of copyright rights over the past several decades, emphasizing 
registration is not an appropriate way to achieve balance in light of the 
numerous barriers to registration in its current form, especially for individual 
artists or smaller entities.  Consequently, after examining the various arguments 
in support of and in opposition to the repeal of the registration requirement, this 
Article ultimately concludes that the overwhelming advantages to eliminating 
the Section 411(a) prerequisite outweigh any perceived or actual drawbacks. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On March 4, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation v. Wall-Street.com, LLC.1  This 
much-anticipated opinion resolved the split among U.S. Courts of Appeals 
concerning the point in time when a copyright owner is first able to file suit 
against an alleged infringer.2  Unlike most areas of law, U.S. copyright owners 
cannot simply seek relief immediately upon detecting infringement of their 
work.  Instead, copyright owners must ensure that they have first complied 
with a peculiarity of copyright law, namely registering the work with the U.S. 
Copyright Office.3   
Unfortunately, the registration process can take months and in some 
cases years to complete,4 thereby significantly delaying the ability of 
copyright owners to stop infringement, despite federal copyright protection 
existing automatically upon creation of the work.5  As such, the author of an 
unregistered work is left with a right to prevent copyright infringement but an 
inability to do so.6  Adding to the inequities of this situation is the fact that 
owners of foreign works do not have to comply with this registration 
prerequisite; instead, they can proceed directly to federal court to protect their 
work.7   
This incongruent treatment is the result of changes made to the 
Copyright Act by Congress some thirty years ago in order to comply with the 
United States’ foreign treaty obligations created by the decision to become a 
 
 1. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 
(2019). 
 2. See infra Part III.C (examining the Fourth Estate case in detail). 
 3. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018).  Registration is also a prerequisite to certain 
remedies for infringement, namely the ability to obtain an award of statutory damages 
or attorney’s fees.  See § 412.  The Copyright Act provides such registration must 
occur prior to the commencement of the infringement unless such registration is made 
within three months after the first publication of the work in question. Id.  
Additionally, unlike Section 411(a) which requires registration prior to filing suit only 
for U.S. works, Section 412 makes no such distinction and is applicable to both U.S. 
and foreign works. Id.  While there are many strong arguments for repealing this 
prerequisite as well, the cost-benefit analysis is different.  As such, the concerns 
associated with the continuing existence of Section 412 is beyond the scope of this 
article.  
 4. See infra Part IV (discussing the significant increase in average processing 
times of copyright applications for registration). 
 5. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). This provision states in pertinent part as follows: “(a) 
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression now known or later developed, 
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” Id. 
 6. See infra Part II.B (examining the debate concerning accession to the Berne 
Convention). 
 7. Id.  
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member of the Berne Convention (“Berne”), the premier international 
copyright agreement.8  More specifically, Berne provides that “the enjoyment 
and the exercise of [copyright] shall not be subject to any formalities,” and 
the U.S. Copyright Act’s registration requirement found in Section 411(a) was 
regarded as violating this principle.9  Instead of simply repealing the 
provision, Congress amended it to apply only to owners of U.S. works, 
thereby creating an unfortunate double standard.10   
For years, many federal courts attempted to ameliorate the unfairness of 
Congress’ decision to place this additional obstacle only upon owners of U.S. 
works seeking protection from copyright infringement.11  To accomplish this, 
federal courts interpreted the language “no civil action for infringement of the 
copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until . . . registration 
of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title” to be met 
as soon as a complete application was submitted to the U.S. Copyright 
Office.12  The aptly named “application approach,” allowed copyright owners 
of U.S. works to effectively apply for federal copyright registration and file a 
copyright infringement lawsuit on the same day.  Accordingly, federal courts 
adopting this approach largely equalized the ability of all copyright owners to 
access the federal court system, regardless of whether the work allegedly 
infringed was a U.S. work or a foreign work.  
Nonetheless, not all federal courts subscribed to this line of reasoning.13  
Others held that apart from the narrowly defined categories of works exempt 
from Section 411(a)’s mandate, the statute was not fulfilled until the Register 
of Copyrights actually registered the work.14  Consequently, courts following 
the so-called “registration approach” would not allow a copyright 
infringement case involving a U.S. work to proceed unless there was proof of 
a federal copyright registration. 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fourth Estate to ascertain 
when registration occurs under the Copyright Act and thereby settle the 
 
 8. Id.; see also, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, Sept. 9, 1886. 
 9. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra 
note 8.  
 10. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.  
 11. See infra Part III.A (identifying courts and cases following the “application 
approach”). 
 12. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018) (emphasis added). To constitute a “complete 
application,” deposit materials and the required filing fee would also need to be 
included with the application for federal copyright registration. Id. 
 13. See infra Part III.B (identifying courts and cases following the “registration 
approach”). 
 14. The exceptions to this requirement include U.S. works for which 
preregistration is an option or applications for federal copyright protection that have 
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dispute among U.S. Courts of Appeals on this issue.15  Ultimately, the Court 
decided Section 411(a) requires more than the submission of application 
materials for federal copyright registration.  According to the Court, 
“registration” does not take place until the Copyright Office has decided 
whether a given work is entitled to registration, thus adopting the “registration 
approach.”16  While the Court appears to have decided this case correctly from 
a statutory interpretation standpoint, the result is exceptionally problematic. 
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Fourth Estate serves as a clarion 
call for much-needed amendments to the Copyright Act.  Further, it is not 
enough to simply redefine “registration” to include the act of filing for a 
federal copyright registration.  In order to properly account for technological 
changes in the methods and speed by which copyrightable works are now 
created, reproduced, and distributed, all copyright owners should be able to 
access the courthouse without delay.  Removal of this antiquated requirement 
will level the proverbial playing field between U.S. works and foreign works, 
while also adding much needed international harmonization to an area of law 
that Congress has repeatedly amended in previous attempts to meet this stated 
objective.17  Ironically, in advocating for the repeal of Section 411(a), this 
Article stands in contrast to the recent scholarly trend in the field of copyright 
law advocating for more, not fewer, formalities.18 
This Article begins in Part I by reviewing relevant provisions of the 
Copyright Act and examining earlier, unsuccessful legislative attempts to 
eliminate Section 411(a)’s registration prerequisite.  Next, Part II discusses 
the federal circuit court split leading to the Supreme Court’s decision.  
Additionally, this section considers the unanimous opinion issued by Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, including her acknowledgment that the current 
 
 15. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 2707 
(2018). 
 16. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Sreet.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 
888 (2019). 
 17. See infra Part II (discussing the Copyright Act of 1976 and the Berne 
Implementation Act of 1989 passed in part to achieve harmony with the laws of other 
countries, notably). 
 18. See infra Part IV.D; see also, e.g., Amanda Reid, Claiming the Copyright, 34 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 425, 427 (2016) (“One way to check and re-balance the 
interests of copyright holders and users is with formalities.”); Michael W. Carroll, A 
Realist Approach to Copyright Law’s Formalities, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1511, 
1513, 1516–16 (2013) (“This Article joins in the general move in favor of increased 
public formalities . . . . [As others] have previously elaborated, formal requirements, 
such as publication-with-notice, registration, deposit, and renewal or maintenance, 
serve a variety of functions that align with copyright law’s principal economic goal of 
providing authors, publishers, and their investors with potential profits for culturally 
appealing works.”); Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory 
Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 312 
(2010) (Examining the “current vogue for ‘reformalizing copyright’” and discussing 
how “formalities, long lamented in U.S. copyright commentary, have now garnered 
favor . . . .”). 
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situation is “unfortunate” and “has not worked as Congress likely 
envisioned.”19  Part III analyzes the numerous arguments in support of and in 
opposition to the repeal of the registration requirement.  Ultimately, this 
Article concludes the overwhelming advantages to amending Section 411(a) 
outweigh any perceived or actual drawbacks. 
II.  CONTINUAL CONGRESSIONAL CHANGE TO SECTION 411(A) 
The Copyright Act of 1976 protects “original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression.”20  The types of works covered by 
copyright law are exceptionally broad and include photographs, computer 
programs, musical compositions, and architectural works.21  As mentioned 
above, copyright protection exists instantly upon creation of the work and 
automatically provides the owner with a comprehensive set of exclusive rights 
such as reproduction, distribution, and public performance or display.22  
Consequently, anyone who violates these rights is an infringer of the 
copyright.23  Nevertheless, the Copyright Act does not allow the copyright 
owner to immediately enforce these rights.24 
A.  Promulgating Section 411(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act 
In connection with the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, 
Congress made several changes to earlier law concerning the ability of a 
copyright owner to bring suit for infringement.  However, eliminating the 
necessity of a federal registration was not one of them.  As the House Report 
accompanying the 1976 revisions affirmed:  
 
 19. Fourth Estate, 139 S.Ct. at 892. 
 20. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).  The U.S. Constitution expressly authorizes Congress 
to promulgate laws in this subject area. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Specifically, 
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 grants Congress the power to “secur[e] for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries”).  Id. 
 21. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).  The full list of protectable categories of works is as 
follows: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and 
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures 
and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. Id. 
 22. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018); see also Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 887; Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 195 (2003). 
 23. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157 (2010) (17 U.S.C. 
§ 501(a) (2018)). 
 24. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.  This stands in sharp contrast to 
another major form of intellectual property, namely trademark law.  The Lanham Act 
allows owners of federal trademarks to file an infringement claim without first seeking 
a registration through the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  This dichotomy is 
problematic as it is not uncommon for a trademark infringement suit to also include 
copyright claims.  See infra Part IV.C.3 (examining this contrast in more detail). 
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The first sentence of Section 411(a) restates the present statutory 
requirement that registration must be made before a suit for copyright 
infringement is instituted.  Under the bill, as under the law now in 
effect, a copyright owner who has not registered his claim can have a 
valid cause of action against someone who has infringed his copyright, 
but he cannot enforce his rights in the courts until he has made 
registration.25 
Instead, the changes were largely limited to issues surrounding the 
procedures for filing a copyright infringement suit in cases where the owner 
of a work had attempted to register it, but the application was eventually 
denied by the Register of Copyrights.26  Many courts interpreted the precursor 
to Section 411(a) as still requiring the owner to obtain the registration 
certificate, and this entailed bringing a mandamus action against the 
Registrar.27  Only after this step was complete could the owner of the refused 
work proceed with the lawsuit.28  To alleviate the continued need to follow 
such a convoluted practice, Section 411(a) also incorporated the following 
language: “[If] registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to 
institute a civil action for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the 
complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights.”29  Moreover, additional 
language was included to clarify that the presence or absence of the Register 
of Copyright in a particular suit would not impact the ability of the case to go 
forward.30   
Notwithstanding Section 411(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act, many of the 
more progressive modifications were made with a view toward possible 
membership in the Berne Convention.31  The Berne Convention was, and still 
is, regarded as the “most respected international copyright treaty.”32  Berne 
dates from 1886 and, even prior to the United States joining, included close 
 
 25. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 157 (1976), 1976 WL 14045. 
 26. Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 164; Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 890.  
 27. See e.g., Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch 
Co., 260 F.2d 637, 640–41 (2d Cir. 1958). 
 28. Id. 
 29. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018). 
 30. Id.  Accordingly, the last line of Section 411(a) now includes the following 
language: “The Register may, at his or her option, become a party to the action with 
respect to the issue of registrability within sixty days after such service, but the 
Register’s failure to become a party shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction to 
determine that issue.” Id.  
 31. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 21 (1988) (“It can safely be stated that Congress 
drafted and passed the 1976 Act with a “weather eye” on Berne.”); see also Hearings 
on Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Before the Subcomm. On Courts, 
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 
100th Cong., 664-87 (1988) [hereinafter House Berne Hearings] (statement of Paul L. 
Goldstein, Professor, Stanford Law School). 
 32. See e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 11 (1988). 
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to 100 members.33  The signatories represented an exceptionally diverse 
grouping of countries with the United States notably absent.34  As the Director 
General of the World Intellectual Property Organization, the global 
organization that administers the Convention, stated in 1986 on the occasion 
of the treaty’s 100th Anniversary, “the absence of the United States of America 
from the Berne Union has, from the very beginning, been considered as 
regrettable . . . For the continued strength and further development of the 
Berne Union, United States membership would be of great significance.”35 
The objective “of the Berne Union [is the] development of ‘effective and 
harmonious’ copyright laws among all nations.”36  In order to achieve these 
goals, Berne requires its members’ domestic copyright laws to meet 
prescribed minimum levels of protection and prohibits most formalities.  The 
Berne Convention defines a “formality” as the imposition of a governmental 
precondition for the “enjoyment [or] exercise” of a copyright owner’s rights.37  
Many formalities were viewed as problematic because they created barriers to 
obtaining copyright protection or resulted in the inadvertent loss of protection.  
Even though numerous changes were made to copyright law in connection 
with the passage of the 1976 Act, some formalities nevertheless remained.38  
Areas of potential non-compliance included the requirement of copyright 
 
 33. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra 
note 8.  The Convention has been revised seven times since it was originally 
concluded.  Id.  This includes Paris (1896), Berlin (1908), Berne (1914), Rome (1928), 
Brussels (1948), Stockholm (1967), and the current version Paris (1971). Id. 
 34. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 2 (1988).  The actual number was 77 members and 
included “most of the free market countries, a number of developing nations, and 
several nations of the Eastern Bloc.”  Id. 
 35. Arpad Bogsch, The First Hundred Years of the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 22 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REVIEW OF THE 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION 291, 298–99 (1986) https://www.w 
ipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/120/wipo_pub_120_1986_09.pdf [perma.cc/28E 
T-YFRT] 
 36. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 20 (1988). 
 37. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 12 (1988), citing Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 8, at art. 5(2). 
 38. There were varying degrees of disagreement between experts and the reports 
of both the House and Senate concerning the extent to which U.S. law still needed to 
be altered for Berne membership.  See e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 40 (1988) (“The 
Committee received conflicting testimony about the nature of the prohibited 
formalities.”).  This divergence of opinion is reflected in the many different hearings 
and eventual bills introduced in Congress attempting to potentially reconcile U.S. law 
with the requirements of the Berne Convention. See e.g., Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1986, S. 2904, 99th Cong. (1986); Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1988, S. 1301, 100th Cong. (1988); Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1987, S. 1971, 100th Cong. (1987); Berne Implementation Act 
of 1988, H.R. 4262, 100th Cong. (1988) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 100-568).  In 
comparison to some of the other implementation bills, H.R. 4262 took a “minimalist” 
approach while S. 1301 proposed quite substantial revisions.   
9
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notice39 and, most relevant to this Article, the necessity of federally registering 
one’s copyright before bringing a legal action for infringement of the work.   
B.  Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 
Despite more than a century of intransigence, it became increasingly 
clear that the benefits of U.S. membership in the Berne Convention 
outweighed the purported onus of compliance.40  This was due in large part to 
the increasing importance of intellectual property to the U.S. economy.41  In 
the mid-to-late 1980s, the United States was experiencing substantial trade 
deficits in most categories of goods and services.42  However, this was not the 
case with regard to copyrighted works, as the United States had become the 
world’s largest exporter of such materials.43  In fact, this sector of the 
economy was generating a trade surplus of more than one billion dollars.44  
Nonetheless, around the same time, the U.S. International Trade Commission 
estimated American companies were losing approximately fifty billion dollars 
per year due to global piracy.45  Such losses were the result of advances in 
technology that made it easier to copy and disseminate copyrighted works, but 
also arguably caused by “inadequate legal protection for United States 
intellectual property around the world.”46  
Yet the United States did not have much leverage to request 
improvements in the copyright laws of other nations as historically the United 
States had been incredibly reluctant to amend its own provisions to simply 
remove its remaining formalities.  Accordingly, the “American negotiating 
position [was] placed at a disadvantage with regard to improved copyright 
protection in foreign countries” because the “United States neither belongs to 
the Berne Union nor has a copyright law that would allow us to join.”47  As 
the House Report detailed:   
 
 39. The requirement of copyright notice was previously one of the biggest 
barriers to the United States membership in Berne. See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 12 
(1988).  As the Senate Report aptly stated: “The requirement that a work bear some 
sort of a notice of copyright in order to obtain or maintain copyright protection has 
been a feature of every U.S. copyright law since the original Copyright Act of 1790.”  
Id.  Additionally, the Committee agreed with the Register of Copyright regarding the 
need to eliminate this provision, noting “the same conclusion has been reached by 
virtually every witness and commentator who has addressed the [Section 401 et seq.] 
notice provisions of current U.S. copyright law.”  Id. At 13.   
 40. Id. at 14–15 
 41. Id. at 15.  
 42. Id. at 2. 
 43. Id. 
 44. In 1987, the surplus was more than 1.5 million dollars.  Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 18 (1988). 
10
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In bilateral negotiations, foreign countries often point to the perceived 
deficiencies in U.S. protection, creating an excuse to avoid making 
improvements to their own laws.  By way of illustration, in bilateral 
negotiations with Singapore and Korea, the American negotiators were 
repeatedly asked the difficult question of why the United States was 
pushing so hard for strong copyright protection in these countries 
while we did not adhere to the Berne Convention.48 
Adding to the impetus for change at the time, the United States had 
successfully lobbied to include intellectual property as one of the topics of 
negotiation in connection with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”), a multilateral trade agreement focused on removing barriers to 
international trade.49  Differences in the protection of intellectual property 
were increasingly seen as creating barriers to trade, and there was a growing 
recognition of the need for harmonization in this area of the law.50  As one 
commentator aptly stated:  “No major trading nation in today’s world can 
enjoy the indulgence of having intellectual property laws significantly 
different from those of the world community.  In one sense, unusual 
intellectual property laws are a tariff and an unnatural barrier to world 
trade.”51 
Consequently, between 1985 and 1988, both the Senate and House of 
Representatives conducted numerous hearings on the possibility of U.S. 
adherence to the Berne Convention.52  Ultimately, this resulted in two very 
different bills originating from each chamber in 1988.  While the House 
version of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 utilized a 
“minimalist approach,” the Senate included more comprehensive 
amendments to the current copyright law.53 
 The U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary’s report accompanying its 
bill, H.R. 4262, provided that the objectives of the legislation were to amend  
the Copyright Act only where there is a clear conflict with the express 
provisions of the Berne Convention (Paris Act of 1971); and further, 
to amend only insofar as it is necessary to resolve the conflict in a 
manner compatible with the public interest, respecting the pre-existing 
balance of rights and limitations in the Copyright Act as a whole.54   
 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 19.  Specifically, it was placed on the agenda of the Uruguay Round 
Negotiations. Id.   
 50. J. Thomas McCarthy, Intellectual Property – America’s Overlooked Export, 
20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809, 811–13 (1995). 
 51. Id. at 816.  
 52. See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 5-6 (1988); H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 7–10 
(1988). 
 53. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 7; S. REP. NO.100-352. 
 54. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 20.  
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As such, the changes originally proposed by the House bill were quite 
limited55 and did not include any amendments to the registration prerequisite 
of Section 411(a).  Although the House Report acknowledged that there were 
“divergent views” on whether the “requirement that claimants seek 
registration before copyright infringement suits,” was compatible with Berne, 
the [House Judiciary] Committee ultimately decided the precondition was 
merely “procedural in nature and does not in any sense lead to a ‘loss of 
copyright.’”56  Additionally, the Committee questionably claimed this 
determination was strengthened by the fact that other Berne Convention 
countries “maintain registration systems” and “have procedural requirements 
for bringing copyright infringement actions:  papers must be served and filed, 
documents must be produced, court costs and litigation costs must be paid.”57  
While it is difficult to liken registration as a prerequisite to the filing of a 
lawsuit with an obligation to provide service of process or the mere presence 
of an optional copyright registry, the House Judiciary Committee initially took 
this position in its report.58  Even so, the Committee “considered the 
contention that other countries might retaliate against the United States” if 
changes were not made to Section 411(a) after joining Berne but in the end, 
decided “these concerns are probably not well-founded and are certainly 
speculative.”59  Nonetheless, the House eventually relented on this issue, 
agreeing to change this portion of the proposed legislation to avoid a conflict 
with the Berne Convention’s prohibition on formalities.60 
The report from the Senate Committee on the Judiciary analyzed the 
issues associated with Section 411(a) much differently, and accordingly, it 
recommended significant amendments to the language of the provision.61  
From the perspective of the Senate Judiciary Committee, “[t]he failure to 
register a claim of copyright in a work has profound consequences for the 
ability of an author or other copyright claimant to enforce his or her claim to 
 
 55. Id. at 25–27, 38, 50.  These changes included: amending the compulsory 
jukebox licensing system (“Section 8 of the bill proposes changes to the current 
jukebox compulsory license by creating a new licensing system based on negotiations 
with the compulsory license used as a fall-back should negotiations fail.”), removing 
the requirement of notice (“The amendments to sections 401 and 402 make use of the 
copyright notice voluntary – a work will no longer fall into the public domain at any 
time because it is published without notice.”), and rejecting the call to expand 
protection for architectural works (The Subcommittee “decided to scale back the 
extent of the amendments” and left current law providing for protection on 
architectural plans but not the building itself intact) or moral rights (“[T]he Committee 
finds that current United States law meets the requirements of the Berne 
Convention.”). Id. 
 56. Id. at 41. 
 57. Id. at 42–43.  See Section IV infra for further evaluation of this determination. 
 58. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 41. 
 59. Id. at 43. 
 60. Infra note 204.  
 61. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 64–65. 
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copyright.”62  While the Senate report recognized the author of an unregistered 
work technically has a copyright in the work, practically speaking the 
“‘enjoyment and exercise’ of that copyright is severely limited, or perhaps 
non-existent, if [the author] is barred access to the only forum in which [he or 
she] may seek to prevent, or to be compensated for, unauthorized 
reproductions or other infringements of the work.”63  The result was the author 
of an unregistered work has at most “a right without a remedy.”64  The report 
also highlighted the fact that no other “major player in the Berne system . . . 
requires registration as a condition of judicial enforcement of copyright.”65  
Additionally, no such requirement is “found in the copyright systems of those 
Berne members, such as the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth 
countries, whose legal systems, like ours, derive from the common law.”66   
Unlike the House Committee, the Senate was concerned about the 
negative impact this could have on international copyright protection if no 
changes were made to Section 411(a).67  As the report elucidated, “[i]f the 
world’s largest exporter of copyrighted goods takes the position that a 
government agency may, without violating Berne standards, be entrusted with 
the keys to the courthouse door in infringement actions, other countries may 
seize upon this precedent to impose truly onerous and unjustified prerequisites 
to copyright enforcement in their legal systems.”68  The Senate Committee 
also disagreed with the House Committee’s position that the prospect of 
retaliation was purely speculative, instead viewing it as a genuine risk of 
retaining Section 411(a) in its current form.69  Additionally, the report 
cautioned:  
This . . . would undermine the advantages for enhanced trade in 
copyrighted works that would otherwise flow from adherence to 
Berne.  The burden lifted from the shoulders of our trade negotiators 
by U.S. adherence to Berne would be replaced by another difficult 
addition to the agenda of our bilateral discussions on copyright 
policy.70   
Not surprisingly, the Senate’s version of the Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1988 would have replaced Section 411(a) with the 
 
 62. Id. at 13.  
 63. Id. at 16. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 18.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 18–20. 
 68. Id. at 17.  
 69. Id. at 18. 
 70. Id. 
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following language: “Registration is not a prerequisite to the institution of a 
civil action for infringement of a copyright.”71 
Ultimately, the House and Senate compromised by seizing upon an 
exception to the treaty’s prohibition on formalities.72  While the Berne 
Convention forbids member states from imposing preconditions that impinge 
on the ability to “enjoy and exercise” copyright rights, this bar only applies to 
foreign works.73  Therefore, the United States would technically be free to 
require compliance with additional obligations for domestic works.74  The end 
result was an amendment to Section 411(a) that read as follows:  “[N]o civil 
action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be 
instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made in 
accordance with this title.”75  Accordingly, this created an unfortunate double 
standard concerning access to the courts dependent upon where the work was 
first published.76  While owners of foreign works could now immediately file 
a copyright infringement suit in the United States, owners of domestic works 
could not because the exemption to the registration requirement was not 
universally applicable.  The arguable unfairness of the situation did not go 
unnoticed.77 
C.  Copyright Reform Act of 1993 
In 1993, bills were introduced concurrently in both chambers of 
Congress to repeal Section 411(a) and thereby rectify the imbalance between 
the handling of domestic and foreign works under the statute.78  As the sponsor 
of the Senate bill stated, “Congress created a two-tier system that continued 
to impose [the registration] requirement on American authors, but exempted 
foreign authors.  So we in effect, decided to discriminate against American 
authors, and we continue to do so.”79  Additionally, the sponsor of the House 
bill remarked that “While the two-tier approach permitted adherence to the 
Berne Convention, it has resulted in U.S. authors being less favorably treated 
 
 71. Id. at 36.  As reflected in the House Report, there was an “overwhelming 
consensus” that the then current balance of rights in the Copyright Act reflected 
“deeply felt legal, economic and social values . . . ” notwithstanding the benefits of 
international harmony.  H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 20 (1988). 
 72. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 16; H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 40. 
 73. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 18–19. 
 74. Id.  
 75. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018). 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
 78. H.R. 897, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 373, 103d Cong. (1993). 
 79. Copyright Reform Act of 1993: Hearing on S. 373 Before the Subcomm. on 
Patents, Copyright and Trademarks of the Senate, 103d Cong. 2-3 (1993) [hereinafter 
Hearing on Copyright Reform Act] (statement of Senator Dennis DeConcini). 
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than foreign authors.  With Berne adherence behind us, it is time to rethink 
the two-tier approach.”80   
In connection with Congressional hearings on the bills, numerous 
creators testified to the challenges and negative impacts associated with the 
registration precondition in place for U.S. works.81  Authors and 
photographers explained the practical impossibility of registering all of one’s 
artistic outputs due to the sheer volume of works produced and attendant 
costs.82  As one author stated, “[t]o register every copyright is an impossibility 
for the fertile and prolific creator.  [Many] cannot afford the burden of 
registering every one of their poems, essays, stories, photographs, sketches.”83  
This was especially problematic for professional photographers, who often 
produce thousands of photos each month,84 and large photographic studio 
chains, which can generate almost half a million during the same time 
period.85  Somewhat relatedly, many individuals also testified to the fact that 
creative types frequently do not have the time to devote to completing 
copyright registration forms or are simply unaware of the necessity of 
copyright registration and its importance to protecting their works.86   
Additionally, in some creative industries, infringement may even occur 
prior to the authorized commercial release of the work.  This is due to the fact 
that “works intended for publication usually are not registered until they are 
in final form and are being disseminated to the public.”87  For example, some 
companies are often not able to immediately register the works due to testing 
 
 80. 139 CONG. REC. E33701 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1993) (statement of Rep. 
Hughes). 
 81. See Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 48 (testimony of Erica Jong). 
 84. Id. at 161 (submission of Jim Marie of Purple Mesa Productions) (“Like 
many professional photographers, I produce thousands of individual images each year, 
to be more specific I produced 1,436 images in the last 30 days! Time constraints, 
limited staff (I am the chief cook and bottle washer in my business) and complicated 
forms make registration of each photograph a virtual impossibility.”). 
 85. Id. at 180–81 (statement of Olan Mills, II, Chairman of the Board, Olan Mills, 
Inc.: “Our lawyers tell us that the prior registration requirements have greatly 
complicated that enforcement effort. So, you might ask, why don’t we register? 
Simply stated, advance registration would be an enormous burden. We do not know 
what photographs will be infringed, so we would need to register each and every 
photograph. As I said before, we have 900 studios. In total, our company produces 
well over 100,000 photographs per week.”).  
 86. Id. at 48 (testimony of Erica Jong) (“Most do not even know about the 
requirements of registration as a precondition for meaningful enforcement”); Id. at 
132 (testimony of Enid Greene Waldholtz, Corporate Counsel, Novell, Inc.) (“[T]his 
is something that’s magnified greatly in the smaller companies who don’t have the 
resources or the knowledge of the copyright registration requirements to protect 
themselves.”). 
 87. Preregistration of Certain Unpublished Copyright Claims, 70 Fed. Reg. 42, 
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and adjustments that must occur prior to the release of a new product.  As the 
corporate counsel of one such entity explained:  
[In] the software industry, the pressures of getting your product to 
market are such that we don’t always get our registration on file by the 
time we roll out the product.  We are still making changes to the 
product at the last possible moment before reproduction for sale . . . . 
Another software company, very prominent in the industry, had to file 
suit recently to combat piracy of one of their beta releases.  And so it 
is not unusual for even the largest software companies to not have 
registered their products at the time it is rolled out.88  
Consequently, the delay between discovering an infringement and 
procuring the obligatory registration can result in the loss of thousands of 
dollars in potential sales.89 
Ultimately, despite the many persuasive arguments concerning the 
harms associated with the registration prerequisite, the legislation was never 
enacted.  While the House version of the bill passed twice, the Senate’s 
companion bill never made it to the floor.90  However, more than a decade 
later, the problems of pre-release infringement and its connection to Section 
411(a) would once again be examined by Congress. 
D.  Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005 
In 2005, copyright owners from the entertainment industry succeeded in 
convincing Congress that the current law needed to be amended as “the 
existing rules making copyright registration a prerequisite for suit for 
infringement of United States works . . . [were] unduly burdensome on 
plaintiffs seeking relief against pre-release infringement in civil suits for 
copyright.”91  Instead of completely removing the requirement of registration 
under Section 411(a), the legislative history makes clear the Family 
Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005 (“FECA”) was a response to a 
specific type of pre-registration infringement, namely the “illicit camcording” 
of motion pictures.92  The Senate Report accompanying the legislation 
described the typical acts associated with such illegal recordings as follows: 
 
 88. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 132 (testimony of Enid 
Greene Waldholtz, Corporate Counsel, Novell, Inc.). 
 89. Id. (“We lost thousands of dollars in potential sales to software pirates just in 
the interim between the time we found the infringement and the time we got expedited 
registration.”) (emphasis added).  See infra Section IV.C.1 (discussing the monetary 
costs associated with the expedited registration process and how it is not a solution to 
the delays attendant in the current system). 
 90. 5 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 17:80 (rev. ed. 2018). 
 91. Preregistration of Certain Unpublished Copyright Claims, supra note 87. 
 92. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-33, at 2 (2005). 
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[A]n offender attends a pre-opening “screening” or a first-weekend 
theatrical release, and uses sophisticated digital equipment to record 
the movie.  A camcorded version is then sold to a local production 
factory or to an overseas producer where it is converted into DVDs or 
similar products and sold on the street for a few dollars per copy . . . .  
Causing greater financial harm, these camcorded versions are posted 
on the Internet through certain peer-to-peer networks and made 
available for millions of users to download.93 
Such infringements purportedly resulted in a significant loss for the 
Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”), as studies found these 
“camcorded versions of movies in theatrical release account[ed] for more than 
90 percent of the first copies of motion pictures illegally distributed on the 
Internet.”94  In order to remedy the situation, FECA directed the Register of 
Copyright to issue regulations in order to create a process by which works 
could be “preregistered.”95  However, such preregistration would merely serve 
“as a place-holder for limited purposes, mainly when a copyright owner needs 
to sue for infringement while a work is still being prepared for commercial 
release.”96  The statute also expressly restricted preregistration to those 
categories of copyrightable works that had historically been infringed prior to 
their authorized commercial distribution.97 
Ultimately, the Register of Copyrights determined the following classes 
of works were eligible for preregistration98: (1) motion pictures; (2) sound 
 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
 95. 17 U.S.C. § 408(f) (2018). 
 96. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Preregistration Information,  http://www.copyrigh 
t.gov/prereg/help.html [perma.cc/4UG3-77UZ] (last accessed April 12, 2020). 
 97. Id. 
 98. It is also worth mentioning the other category of copyrighted works that had 
previously been granted special treatment with regard to the necessity of registration 
prior to an infringement suit.  At the time the Copyright Act of 1976 was originally 
passed, Congress carved out a small exception to the registration prerequisite for 
broadcasts that were being transmitted live. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 46.  Very little is 
said about this provision in the legislative history aside from the fact that it “is intended 
to deal with the special situation presented by works that are being transmitted ‘live’ 
at the same time they are being fixed in tangible form for the first time.” H.R. REP. 
NO. 105-25, at 157 (1997); see also 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 7.16 (Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed. 2018) [hereinafter 
NIMMER & NIMMER] (describing the exception as “[t]his strange provision”).  Such 
works did not require prior registration in order to bring an infringement action, but 
instead a suit could be brought even before the work’s first fixation. 17 U.S.C. § 411(b) 
(2018); see also NIMMER & NIMMER § 7.16.  However, the statute expressly provided 
that in order to be eligible to utilize this exception, owners of such works were also 
required to serve notice upon the infringer not less than ten days before such fixation, 
identify the work along with the specific time and source of its first transmission, and 
declare an intention to secure copyright in the work. 17 U.S.C. § 411(b) (2018).  
Additionally, the copyright owner was required to register the work within three 
17
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recordings; (3) musical compositions; (4) literary works being prepared for 
publication in book form; (5) computer programs (including videogames); and 
(6) advertising or marketing photographs.99  Additionally, the regulations 
stipulate a copyrighted work must also be unpublished and be in the process 
of becoming prepared for commercial distribution.100  Moreover, as the 
Copyright Office has made clear, “[p]registration is not a substitute for 
registration,”101 and therefore, the work must ultimately be registered the 
earlier of three months after the first publication of the work or one month 
after the copyright owner has learned of the infringement.102  If the owner of 
a preregistered work fails to register the work during the required time frame, 
a court must dismiss an action for copyright infringement that occurred before 
or within the first two months after first publication.103 
While FECA provided some relief from the registration prerequisite 
under Section 411(a), it was quite limited.  As only certain categories of works 
in very specific contexts were able to utilize the new preregistration process, 
the vast majority of copyrighted works created in the United States were still 
subject to the traditional rule mandating registration prior to bringing an 
infringement suit.104  However, courts were increasingly attempting to 
mitigate the harshness of this statutory requirement through a combination of 
various statutory interpretations and public policy arguments.  Ultimately, the 
U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on these practices and resolved the split 
among U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
III.  CONFLICTING JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
Prior to 2010, courts often classified the registration requirement under 
Section 411(a) as jurisdictional in nature.105  In fact, approximately 200 
 
months after its first transmission. Id.  In 1997, a technical amendment was made to 
this provision, changing the time frame for the service of notice upon the potential 
infringer from 10 days to “not less than 48 hours.” H.R. 672, 105th Cong. (1997).  
According to the legislative history, this modification was necessary because the 
“provision has proven problematic when applied to a number of sporting events, 
especially elimination play-offs. In many instances the teams and the times of the 
games are not known 10 days in advance. Therefore, this notice provision is amended 
to provide for notice of not less than 48 hours.”  H.R. REP. NO. 105-25, at 16 (1997); 
NIMMER & NIMMER, § 7.16. Eventually, this provision was recodified as 17 U.S.C. § 
411(c) due to a later amendment. See NIMMER & NIMMER § 7.16. 
 99. Preregistration of Copyrights, 37 C.F.R. § 202.16 (2018). 
 100. Id. 
 101. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 96. 
 102. Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, U.S.C. § 408(f) (2019). 
 103. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 96. 
 104. Preregistration of Copyrights, 37 U.S.C. § 202.16 (2018). 
 105. See, e.g., Stuart Weitzman, LLC v. Microcomputer Resources, Inc., 542 F.3d 
859, 863 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Normally, of course, the district court would certainly 
have subject matter jurisdiction over a copyright infringement claim. However, the 
Copyright Act makes clear that ‘no action for infringement of the copyright in any 
18
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decisions had regarded it as such.106  However, in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. 
Muchnick, the U.S. Supreme Court held Section 411(a) did not restrict a 
federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction.107  While recognizing the provision 
had historically been treated as “jurisdictional” and was therefore a factor in 
the analysis, the Court held this characterization was not dispositive.108  
Instead, the Court determined the provision was merely imposing “a type of 
precondition to suit that supports nonjurisdictional treatment under our 
precedents.”109  The Court supported its position by explaining that Section 
411(a) is not clearly labeled as jurisdictional, is not located in a jurisdiction-
granting provision, and contains numerous congressionally authorized 
exceptions such as its inapplicability to non-U.S. works.110  The concurrence 
further emphasized that earlier decisions characterizing registration as 
jurisdictional should be accorded “no precedential effect” as none of them 
were “from this Court, and most are ‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings.’”111 
Reed’s definitive characterization of Section 411(a)’s registration 
prerequisite as nonjurisdictional, along with the concurrence questioning the 
value of prior caselaw related to this provision, brought the developing split 
among the federal courts into sharper focus.  Both before and after Reed, there 
were two conflicting interpretations of Section 411(a)’s registration 
requirement in the circuit courts.112  Some courts began to interpret the 
requirement of registration under Section 411(a) as fulfilled once a complete 
 
United States work shall be instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has 
been made in accordance with this title.’ 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (noting also that an 
infringement action may be brought if application for a copyright has been made and 
denied). ‘The consensus among federal appellate courts is that the provisions of 17 
U.S.C. § 411(a) are jurisdictional.’”). 
 106. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 173–74 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (citing Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment 
Below at 38, Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. 154 (No. 08-103)). 
 107. Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. at 157.   
 108. Id. at 169. 
 109. Id. at 166. 
 110. Id. at 165.  See supra Section II.B for a discussion regarding Congress’ 
removal of non-US works from the registration precondition under Section 411(a) as 
part of the changes necessary for the United States to become a member of the Berne 
Convention.  Additionally, the Court made passing reference to the special treatment 
of live broadcasts under Section 411(c).  See also supra note 98 (explaining this 
limited exception). 
 111. Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. at 173–174 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 7.16(B)(2)(c). 
 112. See Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 615 (9th Cir. 
2010) (attributing the names for these two approaches to the Tenth Circuit in La 
Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005)) 
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application113 for registration was filed with the Copyright Office – this 
became known as the “application approach.”114  Such a reading of the statute 
was further bolstered by the removal of jurisdiction from the analysis post-
Reed.  Other courts maintained the prerequisite was only satisfied once the 
Copyright Office acted upon an application and either approved or rejected 
 
 113. In order to constitute a complete application, the application itself, the filing 
fee, and any necessary deposit materials would need to be submitted.  See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 408 (“Copyright registration in general”). 
 114. See, e.g., Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619–21 (holding the application 
approach is the proper interpretation); Penpower Tech., Ltd. v. S.P.C. Tech., 627 F. 
Supp. 2d 1083, 1091 (N.D. Ca. 2008) (“The Court is convinced that the plain language 
of § 411 permits a plaintiff to initiate a copyright infringement claim before the actual 
issuance of a registration certificate.”); Action Tapes, Inc. v. Mattson, 462 F.3d 1010, 
1013 (8th Cir. 2006) (“A copyright in a work ‘subsists from its creation.’ However, 
the copyright owner may not sue for infringement under the federal Copyright Act 
until the owner has delivered the deposit, application, and fee required for registration 
to the United States Copyright Office.”) (citations omitted); Positive Black Talk, Inc. 
v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 365 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Although some 
circuits require that a plaintiff actually obtain a certificate from the Copyright Office 
before bringing suit, the Fifth Circuit requires only that the Copyright Office actually 
receive the application, deposit, and fee before a plaintiff files an infringement 
action”); Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“Although a copyright no longer need be registered with the Copyright Office to be 
valid, an application for registration must be filed before the copyright can be sued 
upon”); Geoscan, Inc. of Tex. v. Geotrace Techs., Inc., 226 F.3d 387, 393 (5th Cir. 
2000) (“[A] plaintiff has complied with all statutory formalities for copyright 
registration when the Copyright office receives the plaintiff’s application for 
registration, fee, and deposit.”); Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386–
87 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding only the “payment of the required fee, deposit of the work 
in question, and receipt by the Copyright Office of a registration application” is 
necessary to bring suit); Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1108 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(“A plaintiff has complied with the statutory formalities when the Copyright Office 
receives the plaintiff’s application for registration, fee and deposit”); Caner v. Autry, 
16 F. Supp. 3d 689, 708 (W.D. Va. 2014) (“[T]he Application Approach represents a 
better reading of the provisions of the Copyright Act at issue, and . . . it better 
effectuates the policies Congress meant to promote through that Act.”); Phx. 
Renovation Corp. v. Rodriguez, 403 F. Supp. 2d 510, 515 (E.D. Va. 2005) (“[A] 
complaint alleging that the copyright holder properly applied for registration with the 
Copyright Office is sufficient to satisfy the precondition to an infringement action.”); 
Int’l Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass’n v. Power Washers of N. Am., 81 F. Supp. 2d 
70, 72 (D.D.C. 2000) (“Having considered Power Washers’ motion, Kitchen 
Exhaust’s opposition thereto, and the record of this case, the court concludes that 
Kitchen Exhaust’s attempts at registration before filing suit were adequate under the 
Copyright Act . . . .”); see also, Gable-Leigh v. N. Am. Miss, No. 01-1019, 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 25614, 2001 WL 521695, at *4 (C.D. Cal. April 13, 2001). 
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it.115  This was referred to as the so-called “registration approach.”116  
Ultimately, in March 2019, the Supreme Court revisited Section 411(a) in 
order to resolve this split in Fourth Estate.117  In the meantime, as one court 
rightly stated, “[c]opious judicial ink has been spilled over the proper 
prerequisites for bringing a copyright suit in federal court.”118   
A.  The “Application Approach” 
Courts adopting the application approach, as well as the leading treatise 
on Copyright Law,119 claimed that it better comported with the language of 
various statutory provisions in the Copyright Act, effectively addressed a 
number of policy concerns, and reflected Congress’ overall purpose in passing 
the 1976 Act, namely providing broad copyright protection.120  Examining the 
statutory language of Section 411(a) first, courts often viewed the following 
language as supporting their position:   
In any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee required 
for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper 
form and registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to 
institute an action for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the 
complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights.121   
Since the Copyright Act allows a copyright owner to file an infringement 
action regardless of whether the Register of Copyrights ultimately determines 
the work is entitled to registration or alternatively is rejected, adherents to this 
 
 115. See supra Section II.A. (discussing the change to copyright law that made it 
clear copyright owners could proceed with a copyright infringement lawsuit even if 
the Register of Copyrights determined the work in question was not copyrightable 
after evaluating an application for registration). 
 116. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 
1340 (11th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019); La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1208 
(“A suit for copyright infringement cannot be brought unless and until the copyright 
is registered.”); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1-26, 843 F. Supp. 2d 565, 568 (E.D. Pa. 
2011) (“Under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), absent certain circumstances not applicable here, 
one cannot bring a copyright infringement action until the copyright is registered.”); 
Loree Rodkin Mgmt. Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1055 (C.D. 
Cal. 2004) (“[T]he plain language of the Copyright Act unambiguously mandates the 
actual issuance of a registration certificate before a copyright action is brought . . . .”). 
 117. 139 S. Ct. 881, 887 (2019). 
 118. Caner, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 705. 
 119. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 7.16(B)(3)(b)(ii). 
 120. Caner, 16 F. Supp. 3d. at 708; Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 
606 F.3d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 2010), abrogated by Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. 
Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019). 
 121. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018). 
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approach argued it was logical to conclude the application to register is 
sufficient to fulfill the precondition to filing an infringement action.122   
Many of the courts adhering to this interpretation of the Copyright Act 
also pointed to Section 410(d) to reinforce their conclusion.  Section 410(d) 
states:  “The effective date of a copyright registration is the day on which an 
application, deposit, and fee, which are later determined by the Register of 
Copyrights or by a court of competent jurisdiction to be acceptable for 
registration, have all been received in the Copyright Office.”123  As this 
subsection provides for a later approved registration to be back-dated to the 
original date of application,124 courts held this lent additional strength to the 
argument that “registration” occurs on the day the application is actually 
received by the Copyright Office.125   
Likewise, Section 408(a) can also be read to provide further credence to 
the argument that “registration” requires only submission of a completed 
application.  This provision of the Copyright Act states:  “[T]he owner of a 
copyright or of any exclusive right in the work may obtain registration of the 
copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by 
this section, together with the application and fee specified by sections 409 
and 708.”126  Impliedly, the “sole requirement for obtaining registration is 
delivery of the appropriate documents and fee.”127  Additionally, courts relied 
on the last portion of Section 408(a), which stipulates “registration is not a 
condition of copyright protection” to further strengthen their argument.128 
Aside from the statutory language, proponents of the application 
approach argued it “most efficaciously facilitates the judicial protection of 
copyrights through infringement actions.”129  Courts were concerned about 
 
 122. Prunte v. Universal Music Group, 484 F. Supp. 2d 32, 40 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, at § 7.16(B)(1)(a)(i)); see also Cosmetic 
Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621. 
 123. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (2018). 
 124. See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618; Pruente, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 40.  The 
Ninth Circuit in Cosmetic Ideas acknowledged a possible limitation to this argument 
“because this back-dating does not occur until after the Copyright Office or a court 
has deemed the registration acceptable, the statute could be read to require action by 
the Register to effect registration.” Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618.   
 125. Foraste v. Brown Univ., 248 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.R.I. 2003); see also Cosmetic 
Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618; Pruente, 484 F. Supp. 2d. at 40.  
 126. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2018). 
 127. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617; see also Pruente, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 40; 
Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. America Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D.N.C. 
2004). 
 128. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2018); La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel 
Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1203–04 (10th Cir.  2005) (discussing the arguments of those 
courts adopting the “application approach,” but ultimately deciding to utilize the 
“registration approach”), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 
(2010). 
 129. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1203 (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98 at 
§ 7.16(B)(1)(a)). 
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the delays that would occur if litigants were required to wait for the Copyright 
Office to review an application for registration, especially since the legal 
action would be able to proceed regardless of the determination made by the 
Register on the issue of copyrightability.130  Moreover, the Register’s eventual 
decision is subject to review by the courts.131  However, in the meantime, an 
alleged infringer “may continue to dilute the copyright”132 during the time it 
takes “for a government official [to be] able to sift through and approve what 
is surely a large stack of copyright registration applications.”133   
A strong argument could be made that the application approach best 
promoted judicial economy.  This was because in any case in which the 
copyright owner had applied to register a work but had not yet received a 
response from the Copyright Office, courts adhering to the registration 
approach had to dismiss the case.  More often than not, the copyright owner 
would refile the infringement action in a matter of weeks or months.134  Not 
surprisingly, even proponents of the registration approach acknowledged this 
practice “leads to an inefficient and peculiar result.”135   
Furthermore, there was also a risk the owner of a copyrighted work 
might completely lose the ability to sue for infringement.  Section 507(b) of 
the Copyright Act prohibits any civil action “commenced within three years 
after the claim accrued.”136  Consequently, in a registration approach 
jurisdiction, a copyright owner who filed for an application for registration of 
the work near the end of the statute of limitations period “could see the statute 
of limitations expire during the time it took the Copyright Office to act on the 
application.”137  Nonetheless, courts following the registration approach were 
rarely sympathetic to such concerns.  Instead, courts held the potential for this 
type of loss would serve to encourage owners to register more quickly.138  
Moreover, many courts also viewed resort to policy-based arguments or 
 
 130. See e.g., Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619–620; Caner v. Autry, 16 F. Supp. 
3d 689, 708 (W.D. Va. 2014); Iconbazaar, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 634; Phoenix 
Renovation Corp. v. Rodriguez, 403 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514–515 (E.D. Va. 2005).  
 131. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621. 
 132. Caner, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 708. 
 133. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1197. 
 134. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620. 
 135. Id. (internal citations omitted); Loree Rodkin Mgmt Corp. v. Ross-Simons, 
Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1056–57 (C.D. Cal 2004); Strategy Source, Inc., v. Lee, 
233 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 136. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2018). 
 137. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620. 
 138. See e.g., Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 
1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2017) (“True, an owner who files an application late in the 
statute of limitations period risks losing the right to enforce his copyright in an 
infringement action because of the time needed to review an application. But this 
potential loss encourages an owner to register his copyright soon after he obtains the 
copyright and before infringement occurs.”). 
23
Davik: Unregistered Complaints
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
380 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
legislative history as simply unnecessary in light of what they regarded as 
clear statutory language supporting the registration approach.139  
 
B.  The “Registration Approach” 
Courts adhering to the registration approach often characterized the 
answer to the question of when a copyrighted work is “registered” under 
Section 411(a) as straightforward.  The Eleventh Circuit’s statements in 
Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation v. Wall-Street.com, LLC reflect  
such certitude:  “[T]he text of the Copyright Act makes clear that the 
registration approach that we [previously] endorsed . . . is correct. Filing an 
application does not amount to registration.”140   
Courts professedly found support for the registration approach in Section 
410 which details the registration process itself.  Subsection (a) states:   
When, after examination, the Register of Copyrights determines that, 
in accordance with the provisions of this title, the material deposited 
constitutes copyrightable subject matter and that the other legal and 
formal requirements of this title have been met, the Register shall 
register the claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of registration 
under the seal of the Copyright Office.141   
Courts argued this language plainly stipulates registration can only occur 
after the Copyright Office has actually reviewed the application and that 
 
 139. Id. (“Fourth Estate devotes its remaining statutory arguments to legislative 
history and policy, but ‘[w]hen,’ as here, ‘the words of a statute are unambiguous, then 
. . . judicial inquiry is complete.’ Indeed, ‘[e]ven if a statute’s legislative history 
evinces an intent contrary to its straightforward statutory command, we do not resort 
to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.’”) (citations omitted); see 
also La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1197 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (“The Application approach, at first glance, has some appeal . . . .  Courts 
adopting the Application approach plausibly claim that their approach provides a sort 
of rough justice because it allows copyright owners to file suit while still maintaining 
the requirement that an owner obtain a certificate before a court can invoke the 
remedies contained in Title 17.  Whatever the practical force of this argument, we 
cannot ignore the plain meaning of the statute, nor change the legislative scheme.”) 
(citations omitted), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 
(2010); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, 843 F. Supp. 2d 565, 570 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“We 
certainly understand the strong, largely meritorious, policy considerations that weigh 
in favor of permitting a copyright infringement plaintiff to sue during the pendency of 
his copyright application.  In the end, perhaps the application approach makes more 
practical sense, perhaps not. Either way, our own policy views do not give us license 
to rewrite an unambiguous statute. In enacting 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), Congress chose the 
registration approach, and we must abide by that decision.”) (citations omitted).  
 140. 856 F.3d at 1341. 
 141. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2018). 
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merely filing an application is insufficient to constitute registration.142  
Otherwise, the examination requirement would arguably “be meaningless if 
filing and registration were synonymous.”143 
Relatedly, courts also pointed to Subsection (b) of Section 410 as support 
for the registration approach.  This provision of the Copyright Act provides 
as follows:  “In any case in which the Register of Copyright determines that 
. . . the material deposited does not constitute copyrightable subject matter or 
the claim is invalid for any other reason, the Register shall refuse 
registration.”144  These courts contended that the Copyright Office would not 
have the ability to reject an application purportedly submitted for registration 
if it occurred immediately upon filing.145   
Additionally, courts maintained that Section 410(d) further substantiated 
their position on when registration occurs under the Copyright Act.  As 
discussed above,146 this subsection provides that the effective date of a 
copyright registration is retroactive to the date on which the copyright owner 
originally filed the application.147  However, advocates of the registration 
approach highlight the portion of the statutory language that allows for such 
backdating only after the Register of Copyright has deemed the submission 
“acceptable.”148  According to supporters of the registration approach, this 
further confirms the necessity of review and approval by the Register of 
Copyrights before registration can be said to have taken place, thereby 
rendering the mere act of filing an application legally insufficient.149 
Aside from the language of the Copyright Act itself, courts also held that 
their interpretation of the registration prerequisite under Section 411(a) was 
supported by Congressional changes to the statute, in particular, the Berne 
Convention Implementation Act of 1988 and FECA.150  As detailed above,151 
both pieces of legislation made changes to Section 411(a), namely removing 
the necessity of registration prior to filing an infringement action for foreign 
works and creating a new preregistration procedure for a limited class of 
domestic works.  Congress’ choice to eliminate this precondition for some 
works, but not all, arguably confirms registration must generally be made 
 
 142. Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341. 
 143. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1202 (citing Robinson v. Princeton Review, Inc., 
1996 WL 663880, *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)); see also Loree Rodkin Mgmt. Corp. v. Ross-
Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
 144. 17 U.S.C. § 410(b) (2018).  
 145. Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341. 
 146. Notwithstanding arguments to the contrary, proponents of the application 
approach also view this provision of the Copyright Act as supporting their preferred 
definition of registration.  See supra Section III.A. 
 147. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (2018). 
 148. Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341–42. 
 149. Id. at 1342.  
 150. See e.g., La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 
1205–07 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 151. See supra Sections II.B & II.D. 
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absent an explicit statutory exemption.  Eventually, however, the Supreme 
Court would have to decide which approach was the correct one.  
C.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Approach  
In Fourth Estate, the petitioner, Fourth Estate Public Benefit 
Corporation (“Fourth Estate”), sued the respondent Wall-Street, LLC (“Wall-
Street”) for copyright infringement.152  The two parties had previously entered 
into a licensing agreement in which Fourth Estate had allowed Wall-Street to 
display its news content on Wall-Street’s website.153  However, the license 
agreement required Wall-Street to completely remove from its website all 
Fourth Estate content prior to canceling the agreement.154  Nonetheless, when 
Wall-Street terminated the contract, it continued to display content on its 
website produced by Fourth Estate in violation of the license.155  
Subsequently, Fourth Estate sued Wall-Street and its owner.156 
The complaint alleged that while Fourth Estate had filed applications for 
registration with the Register of Copyrights, the Copyright Office had not yet 
rendered any decisions concerning their copyrightability.157  Consequently, 
Wall-Street and its owner filed a motion to dismiss arguing the Copyright Act 
requires more than merely filing an application, but instead, requires either a 
registration or a denial of a registration prior to filing suit.158  The District 
Court agreed and dismissed the suit, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.159  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of when Section 
411(a)’s copyright registration requirement was met.160  Specifically, “Has 
registration . . . been made in accordance with [Title 17] as soon as the 
claimant delivers the required application, copies of the work, and fee to the 
Copyright Office; or has registration . . . been made only after the Copyright 
Office reviews and registers the copyright?”161  
The Court began by observing that under the Copyright Act protection 
attaches as soon as a work is created.162  As such, the author immediately 
 
 152. 139 S. Ct. 881, 887 (2019). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. According to the Court, “[c]onsideration of Fourth Estate’s filings was 
initially delayed because the check Fourth Estate sent in payment of the filing fee was 
rejected by Fourth Estate’s bank as uncollectible. Id. at 887 n.2. 
 158. Id.; see also Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 
F.3d 1338, 1339 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 159. Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 887.  Ultimately, the Copyright Office denied 
Fourth Estate’s applications for registration. Id.  However, the issue of 
copyrightability was not before the Court. Id. at 887 n.3. 
 160. Id. at 886–87. 
 161. Id. at 886 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 162. Id. at 887; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018).  
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acquires a number of exclusive rights, including the right of reproduction, 
distribution, and public display.163  Furthermore, the Court recognized the 
“Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to institute a civil action for 
infringement of those exclusive rights.”164  Nonetheless, as the Court correctly 
pointed out, “[b]efore pursuing an infringement claim in court, . . . a copyright 
claimant generally must comply with Section 411(a)’s requirement  that 
‘registration of the copyright claim has been made.’”165   
The Court next took a detailed look at the statutory language of Section 
411(a) – beginning with the first two sentences of the provision – which states 
as follows:   
[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States 
work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the 
copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title. In any 
case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee required for 
registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form 
and registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a 
civil action for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the 
complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights.166  
The Court held this language focuses on the action of the Copyright 
Office in approving or denying registration as opposed to the copyright 
owner’s act of applying.167  Therefore, if merely filing an application for 
registration was sufficient, “allowing suit upon refusal of registration – would 
be superfluous.”168  The Court then analyzed the final sentence of Section 
411(a) which allows the Register to “become a party to the action with respect 
to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim.”169  The Court similarly 
held this portion of the statutory provision requires the Register to render a 
decision on the copyrightability of a given application before a suit can be 
filed.170  Per the Court, a different interpretation would negate the ability of 
the Register to join the litigation and deprive a court “the benefit of the 
Register’s assessment.”171 
The Court also examined a number of other provisions that it viewed as 
supportive of its reading of registration in Section 411(a) and thus  
 
 163. Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 887 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018)). 
 164. Id. at 887 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2018)). 
 165. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018)).  The Court took notice of the fact that 
the potential statutory exceptions to the requirement of registration were not present 
and that all the parties were in agreement on this issue. Id. at 888.   
 166. Id. at 888 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018)). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 889. 
 169. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018)). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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necessitating action by the Register.172  This included subsections (a), (b), and 
(d) of Section 410, which the Court maintained “confirms that application is 
discrete from, and precedes, registration.”  In so doing, the Court affirmed the 
analysis previously taken by lower courts following the “registration 
approach.”173  Additionally, the Court evaluated Section 408(f), which allows 
for the preregistration of certain types of works under specific 
circumstances.174  According to the Court, “[a] copyright owner who fears 
prepublication infringement would have no reason to apply for 
preregistration, however, if she could instead simply complete an application 
for registration and immediately commence an infringement suit.”175 
Next, the Court addressed various arguments advanced by Fourth Estate.  
Aside from a number of statutory interpretation claims with which the Court 
disagreed,176 Fourth Estate raised the possibility that a copyright owner could 
completely lose the ability to bring suit if the “registration approach” were 
adopted.  This might occur because the statute of limitations for copyright 
infringement actions is three years and the current processing time for 
applications submitted to the Copyright Office is seven months.177  While the 
Court acknowledged that processing times have increased, the Court 
nonetheless viewed Fourth Estate’s concerns as “overstated.”178  Furthermore, 
the Court stated “[d]elays in Copyright Office processing of applications, it 
appears, are attributable, in large measure, to staffing and budgetary shortages 
that Congress can alleviate, but courts cannot cure.  Unfortunate as the current 
administrative lag may be, that factor does not allow us to revise § 411(a)’s 
congressionally composed text.”179  The Court concluded by holding, 
“‘registration . . . has been made’ within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) 
not when an application for registration is filed, but when the Register has 
registered a copyright after examining a properly filed application.”180   
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id.; see also supra Section III.B. (examining the analysis of “registration 
approach” courts). 
 174. Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 889; see also supra Section II.D. (reviewing the 
promulgation of the preregistration option as part of the Family Entertainment and 
Copyright Act of 2005). 
 175. Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 889–90 (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 
19, 29 (2001)) (rejecting an interpretation that “would in practical effect render [a 
provision] superfluous in all but the most unusual circumstances”). 
 176. Id. at 890–92.  Fourth Estate argued that the phrase “make registration” and 
“registration has been made” refer to submissions by the copyright owner as opposed 
to the Copyright Office’s response to such applications. Id. at 890.  Additionally, 
Fourth Estate maintained that as the Copyright Act states in Section 408(a) that 
“registration is not a condition of copyright protection,” an application for registration, 
not the registration itself, should be sufficient to allow the copyright owner into court.  
Id. at 891.   
 177. Id. at 892. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. 
 180. Id.  
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IV.  DISPENSING WITH THE REGISTRATION PREREQUISITE FOR 
INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS 
The Court’s decision in Fourth Estate to adopt the “registration 
approach” is the correct decision from a purely statutory interpretation 
perspective, as it allows for a less contrived reading of the Copyright Act’s 
provisions.  Nonetheless, the Court did not seem to fully appreciate the 
numerous barriers imposed on copyright owners trying to protect their works 
by requiring a registration decision prior to filing an infringement action.  As 
a report co-authored by Former Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer found, 
“the requirement can result in harm and injustice to copyright owners by 
effectively preventing or unduly delaying injunctive relief, by requiring 
expensive and unproductive paperwork where many copyrights are involved 
in a suit, and by offering defendants an opportunity for dilatory tactics.”181  
While courts could previously utilize the “application approach” to mitigate 
the shortcomings inherent with a system that grants rights immediately upon 
a work’s creation but does not expressly provide for prompt access to the 
courts to enforce such rights, this is no longer a possibility.  Consequently, it 
is now more imperative than ever to amend the copyright law to eliminate the 
Section 411(a) registration prerequisite.  As detailed below, while there may 
be some arguable benefit to incentivizing federal copyright registration and 
relatedly for preserving Section 411(a) as a part of this approach, they are 
negligible when contrasted with the many drawbacks associated with 
maintaining this precondition.  Moreover, as highlighted in the following 
discussion, removal of the registration prerequisite will also likely provide 
numerous independent benefits over the current system.  This Section 
concludes with a brief discussion of the recent trend in academic scholarship 
advocating for a return of copyright formalities and why it appears to be 
misguided, at least regarding the copyright prerequisite of Section 411(a). 
A.  Purported Need to Incentivize Copyright Registration 
One of the leading arguments in opposition to eliminating Section 411(a) 
is that it would have a substantial, negative impact on the number of federal 
copyright registrations.  Discussions concerning the need for incentivizing 
registration were a significant part of the deliberations surrounding the 
passage of the 1976 Copyright Act.  This was due to the fact that one of the 
biggest changes to copyright law wrought by the new legislation was the 
removal of mandatory registration for the protection of copyrightable work.182  
 
 181. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 30 (Report of Co-Chairs 
Barbara Ringer and Robert Wedgeworth, Library of Congress Advisory Committee 
on Copyright Registration and Deposit). 
 182. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2018) (“Copyright registration in general”).  Subsection 
408(a) provides as follows:   
(a) Registration Permissive. At any time during the subsistence of the first term 
of copyright in any published or unpublished work in which the copyright was 
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Even though “registration was made optional, Congress still valued having a 
robust federal register of existing copyrights.”183  Copyright registration 
arguably “provides a useful public record”184 and supplies “the Library of 
Congress with an efficient means of obtaining copies of copyrighted 
works.”185  This is due to the fact that applicants are generally required to 
include “two complete copies or phonorecords of the best edition of the work” 
as part of the application process.186  However, as more fully explored below, 
there are numerous limitations to the claim that the maintenance of Section 
411(a) is necessary or even appropriate to achieve these purported goals.   
1.  More Important Incentives Remain 
The ability to bring a lawsuit in the event of copyright infringement is 
not the only incentive to federally registering a work.  In fact, the 1976 
revision to the Copyright Act provides “two even more powerful incentives 
. . . as [S]ection 410(c) gives a timely registration prima facie effect in 
infringement litigation, and [S]ection 412 conditions the availability of the 
powerful remedies of statutory damages and attorneys’ fees upon timely 
registration.”187  Furthermore, the annual statistics concerning applications 
relative to the number of infringement suits filed are “comparatively 
minuscule” and appear to have “little positive effect on the general goals of 
registration and deposit.”188  For example, in 2017 the Copyright Office 
 
secured before January 1, 1978, and during the subsistence of any copyright 
secured on or after that date, the owner of copyright or of any exclusive right 
in the work may obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the 
Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, together with the 
application and fee specified by sections 409 and 708. Such registration is not 
a condition of copyright protection. 
Id. 
 183. Cosmetic Ideas Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(citing Copyrights Act H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 158 (1976)). 
 184. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 19 (1988). 
 185. Id. 
 186. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2018) (“Copyright registration in general”).  Subsection (b) 
provides as follows: “(b) Deposit for Copyright Registration. Except as provided by 
subsection (c), the material deposited for registration shall include – (1) in the case of 
an unpublished work, one complete copy or phonorecord; (2) in the case of a published 
work, two complete copies or phonorecords of the best edition; (3) in the case of a 
work first published outside the United States, one complete copy or phonorecord as 
so published; (4) in the case of a contribution to a collective work, one complete copy 
or phonorecord of the best edition of the collective work.” 
 187. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 19 (1988). 
 188. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 185 (Draft Working 
Paper of Paul L. Goldstein, Professor, Stanford Law School) (comparing the 1,831 
copyright infringement suits filed in 1991 to the 634,797 works submitted for 
registration the same year and concluding that Section 411(a) “can thus be said to have 
spurred the registration of, at most, only 1,831 works – only slightly more than one-
quarter of one percent of all applications filed that year.  Even this figure is overly 
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received 539,662 applications for registration,189 while the number of new 
lawsuits filed alleging copyright infringement during the same time frame was 
3,472.190  Additionally, the statistics do not specify exactly when or why an 
application for registration was filed.  Even if we generously assume all the 
applications associated with copyright infringement suits were filed solely in 
anticipation of impending litigation and to comply with Section 411(a), this 
only accounts for less than one percent of the submissions to the Copyright 
Office.  Although Section 411(a) allows copyright owners to access the courts,  
two even more powerful incentives included in the 1976 revision of 
the Copyright Act govern what the copyright proprietor may seek once 
the courthouse door is opened:  [S]ection 410(c) gives a timely 
registration prima facie effect in infringement litigation, and [S]ection 
412 conditions the availability of the powerful remedies of statutory 
damages and attorneys’ fees upon timely registration.191 
i.  Prima Facie Validity 
If a copyright owner files an application for registration of a work either 
before or within five years following its first publication, the registration 
certificate “[c]onstitutes prima facie validity of the copyright and of the facts 
stated in the certificate” per Section 410(c) of the Copyright Act.192  As such, 
this causes a “shift of the burden of going forward on this issue to the 
defendant.”193  Conversely, if a copyright owner fails to register a work in 
accordance with the timeline stated in Section 410(c), the proprietor “will 
remain at a substantial disadvantage in the ensuing litigation.”  This is due to 
the fact that the now purported copyright owner will need to first prove the 
work is copyrightable.194  Additionally, the “proprietor will assume the burden 
of proving authorship of the work, and, for a published work, establishing the 
 
generous since a substantial number of these 1,831 works were probably registered 
earlier, ante litem motem.”).  
 189. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., FISCAL 2017 ANNUAL REPORT (2018), 
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2017/ar2017.pdf [perma.cc/J7KG-U8CN]. 
 190. Fewer Copyright Infringement Lawsuits Filed, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS 
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (“TRAC”) REP., https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/civil/483/ 
[perma.cc/QS9U-TAA6] (last visited May 9, 2019) (The total of 3,472 for FY 2017 is 
based on the first eleven months of FY 2017 in which 3,183 suits were actually filed 
and an additional estimate for the twelfth month of  289 new lawsuits). 
 191. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 19–20 (1988).  The Report also noted “Section 205 
(c) and (e) also provide an incentive for transferees of copyright [20] ownership to 
ensure that registration is made.  Finally, of course, there are the intangible factors that 
may lead authors to register their works with the Copyright Office in the belief that a 
registration certificate constitutes a government agency’s stamp of approval on the 
fruit of the author’s creative efforts.” Id. 
 192. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2018). 
 193. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 21 n.5 (1988). 
 194. Id. at 20, 24. 
31
Davik: Unregistered Complaints
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
388 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
origin of the work in either the United States, or a country with which the 
United States has either multilateral or bilateral copyright relations, or 
demonstrating some other basis upon which the court’s enforcement powers 
under U.S. law may be invoked.”195  Consequently, in the vast majority of 
cases, plaintiffs will likely continue to register their works in order to avoid 
an otherwise time consuming and unnecessary impediment to prevailing on 
their claim of copyright infringement.196 
ii.  Statutory Damages and Attorney’s Fees 
Not only does a registration certificate make it easier to prove the 
necessary elements of a successful copyright infringement case, but once a 
viable claim is established, a federal registration allows for the possibility of 
important, additional remedies otherwise not available to the copyright owner.  
Under Section 412, statutory damages are available so long as the work at 
issue was registered either prior to the time of infringement or within three 
months of first publication.197  If a copyright owner elects to recover statutory 
damages in place of actual damages and profits, the amount is usually in the 
range of $750 to $30,000 per work infringed.198  However, if the infringement 
was willful, a court can award up to $150,000 per work infringed.199  Statutory 
damages can be especially helpful in cases where actual damages are difficult 
to determine or where a work “has seemingly little extrinsic value.”200 
Another significant benefit of timely federal registration is the successful 
litigant may be entitled to attorney’s fees.  Section 505 of the Copyright Act 
provides a court with “wide latitude to award attorney’s fees” to the prevailing 
party “based on the totality of circumstances in a case.”201  As the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated in connection with a copyright 
infringement case, the prospect of attorney’s fees can be especially valuable 
 
 195. Id. at 20. 
 196. Id. at 24. 
 197. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2018) (“Registration as prerequisite to certain remedies for 
Infringement”); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, at § 7.16(C) (2019). 
 198. § 504(c)(1) (“Remedies for infringement: Damages and profits”). 
 199. § 504(c)(2). This section also allows a court to reduce the statutory damage 
award under certain circumstances, including cases of “innocent infringement.” Id.  
The statute provides as follows:  “In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of 
proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to 
believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its 
discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.” 
Id.  
 200. La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1199–
1200 (10th Cir. 2005), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 
(2010). 
 201. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1985 (2016); 17 
U.S.C. § 505 (2018) (“Remedies for infringement: Costs and attorney’s fees”); see 
also, Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 533 (1994). 
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“[f]or copyright owners hesitant to engage in the long and expensive process 
of litigation.”202 
iii.  Questionable Impact 
Clearly, the repeal of Section 411(a) would not remove all the available 
incentives associated with registration, let alone the most powerful ones.  
Consequently, the argument that the elimination of  Section 411(a) would 
have a substantial effect on the number of copyrightable works registered is 
speculative at best.  Quite simply, “it is unlikely that many copyright claimants 
would choose to forego registration, given the attendant increased difficulties 
they would encounter in seeking to prove and to obtain redress for 
infringements.”203   
2.  Acquisition of Materials for the Library of Congress 
One of the other principal arguments against the repeal of Section 411(a) 
is that doing so would adversely affect the Library of Congress’ acquisition 
of deposits.  Representative of such concerns is the following statement in a 
House report associated with an earlier bill concerning accession to the Berne 
Convention and the purported necessity of Section 411(a) to both U.S. and 
non-U.S. works:204   
Registration is an important source of acquisitions for the Library of 
Congress . . . .  In a time of fiscal restraint, the absence of this 
acquisition source-which is virtually cost-free to the taxpayer-would 
have to be replaced by either the expenditure of public monies or the 
establishment of increased fees by the Library, or a combination of 
both.  Moreover, registration as a prerequisite to suit helps to ensure 
the existence of a central, public record of copyright claims.  This 
publicly available depository of information is of benefit to both 
copyright owners and users.205 
While the objections raised may have some validity, they appear to be 
highly overstated.  As discussed above, even without Section 411(a), many 
more powerful incentives to registration remain.206  Moreover, as explored in 
more detail below, the Copyright Act contains two separate deposit 
 
 202. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1199–1200.  
 203. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 21 (1988). 
 204. As discussed above, Congress eventually reached a compromise in which 
Section 411(a) was amended to exclude foreign works from its purview in order to 
comply with Berne’s prohibition on formalities.  See supra Section II.B (examining 
the debate concerning accession to the Berne Convention). 
 205. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 42 (1988). 
 206. See supra Section IV.A.1 (discussing prima facie validity, statutory damages, 
and attorney’s fees).   
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provisions.207  While Section 408 is tied to the copyright registration process, 
Section 407 contains a mandatory deposit obligation that is instead triggered 
by the act of publication.208   
The strength of the acquisition argument is limited by the fact that 
Section 407 could be utilized if particular published works are so needed for 
the Library’s collections.209  Some commentators have even proposed 
expanding this statutory authority210 and enforcing the requirement more 
regularly211 to minimize any possible impacts on the Library of Congress’ 
collections.  Additionally, as further explored in the following subsections:  
[T]he Library of Congress need not add all deposited works to its 
collection, it apparently is not required to preserve those works which 
it does add to its collection, and those which it does not so add, 
although retained by the Copyright Office, need only be preserved “for 
the longest period considered practicable and desirable by the Register 
of Copyrights and the Librarian of Congress.”212   
Lastly, there is the more fundamental issue of whether the inequities 
associated with placing the burden of “library building” on creators 
attempting to register their copyrightable works is still appropriate. 
i.  Section 407:  Mandatory Deposit and Major Exemptions 
Section 407(a) of the Copyright Act requires the owner of a copyrighted 
work published in the United States to deposit in the U.S. Copyright Office 
two complete copies of the best edition of the work within three months after 
a work is published for the use of the Library of Congress.213  Furthermore, 
the owner of a work first published in a foreign country but then distributed 
in the United States must also comply with the mandatory deposit 
requirement.214  Although the federal copyright registration process and its 
 
 207. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., U.S. COPYRIGHT CIRCULAR 7D:  MANDATORY 
DEPOSIT OF COPIES OR PHONORECORDS FOR THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (2019), 
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ07d.pdf [perma.cc/6LJ5-V4QD]. 
 208. 17 U.S.C. §§ 407, 408 (2018). 
 209. § 407. 
 210. See e.g., Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 5–6 (Statement 
of Dr. James H. Billington, the Librarian of Congress, accompanied by Mary 
Levering, Acting Register of Copyrights, Barbara Ringer and Robert Wedgeworth, 
Co-chairs, Copyright Advisory Committee). 
 211. But see infra Part IV.A.2.iv (examining the concerns with placing the onus 
of library building on a copyright owner). 
 212. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 7.17[A] (citing 17 U.S.C. § 704(d) 
(2018)). 
 213. 17 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2018). 
 214. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c)(10) (2019) (“Deposit of published copies or 
phonorecords for the Library of Congress”); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 
98, § 7.17(c)(2). 
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attendant deposit requirement under Section 408 can concomitantly satisfy 
Section 407(a), works for which an application has never been filed will still 
need to independently meet this mandatory deposit obligation.215  This is due 
to the fact that the purpose of deposit and registration are similar but not 
identical.216  While deposit is designed to “provide the Library of Congress 
via the Copyright Office with copies and phonorecords of all works published 
within the United States,” registration is meant “to create a written record of 
the copyright ownership in a work.”217   
Failure to comply with the mandatory deposit requirement following a 
written demand by the Register of Copyrights can result in an initial fine of 
up to $250 per work and a required payment to the Library of Congress equal 
to the retail cost of the material sought.218  An additional fine of $2500 can be 
assessed in the event the owner of the work “willfully or repeatedly fails or 
refuses to comply.”219  As such, the mandatory deposit provisions already 
provide the Library of Congress with the means by which to acquire copies of 
almost any copyrightable work so desired.  Consequently, the elimination of 
Section 411(a)’s registration prerequisite is unlikely to have any meaningful 
effect on this facet of the Library of Congress’ acquisitions program.220  
Moreover, many categories of works are no longer required to be 
deposited.  Section 407(c) allows the Register of Copyright to designate entire 
classes of materials as exempt from such deposit obligations altogether.221  
The list of excluded categories is extensive222 and is “intended to apply to that 
 
 215. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 7.17(F). 
 216. Id. at § 7.17(A). 
 217. Id. 
 218. 17 U.S.C. § 407(d) (2018). 
 219. Id. 
 220. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 22–23 (1988). 
 221. § 407(d). 
 222. 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c) states as follows:   
The following categories of material are exempt from the deposit requirements 
of section 407(a) of title 17: 
(1) Diagrams and models illustrating scientific or technical works or 
formulating scientific or technical information in linear or three-dimensional 
form, such as an architectural or engineering blueprint, plan, or design, a 
mechanical drawing, or an anatomical model. 
(2) Greeting cards, picture postcards, and stationery. 
(3) Lectures, sermons, speeches, and addresses when published individually 
and not as a collection of the works of one or more authors. 
(4) Literary, dramatic, and musical works published only as embodied in 
phonorecords. This category does not exempt the owner of copyright, or of the 
exclusive right of publication, in a sound recording resulting from the fixation 
of such works in a phonorecord from the applicable deposit requirements for 
the sound recording. 
(5) Electronic works published in the United States and available only online. 
This exemption includes electronic serials available only online only until such 
time as a demand is issued by the Copyright Office under the regulations set 
forth in § 202.24. This exemption does not apply to works that are published 
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‘material the Library [of Congress] neither needs nor wants’ for its archival 
purposes.”223  Additionally, at least historically, it appears that “a significant 
amount of litigation involves works falling within one of these exempt 
categories.”224  Collectively, this further diminishes the argument that Section 
411(a) is necessary to ensure the Library of Congress’ acquisition activities 
will not be adversely affected.225   
ii.  Section 408:  Deposits of Questionable Utility 
Section 408 of the Copyright Act ordinarily requires an applicant 
seeking federal registration to submit a completed application form, the 
requisite filing fee, and a deposit of two copies of the work.226  While large 
 
in both online, electronic formats and in physical formats, which remain 
subject to the appropriate mandatory deposit requirements. 
(6) Three-dimensional sculptural works, and any works published only as 
reproduced in or on jewelry, dolls, toys, games, plaques, floor coverings, 
wallpaper and similar commercial wall coverings, textiles and other fabrics, 
packaging material, or any useful article.  Globes, relief models, and similar 
cartographic representations of area are not within this category and are 
subject to the applicable deposit requirements. 
(7) Prints, labels, and other advertising matter, including catalogs, published 
in connection with the rental lease, lending, licensing, or sale of articles of 
merchandise, works of authorship, or services. 
(8) Tests and answer material for tests when published separately from other 
literary works. 
(9) Works first published as individual contributions to collective works. This 
category does not exempt the owner of copyright, or of the exclusive right of 
publication, in the collective work as a whole, from the applicable deposit 
requirements for the collective work. 
(10) Works first published outside the United States and later published in the 
United States without change in copyrightable content, if: 
(i) Registration for the work was made under 17 U.S.C. 408 before the 
work was published in the United States; or 
(ii) Registration for the work was made under 17 U.S.C. 408 after the 
work was published in the United States but before a demand for deposit 
is made under 17 U.S.C. 407(d). 
(11) Works published only as embodied in a soundtrack that is an integral part 
of a motion picture.  This category does not exempt the owner of copyright, or 
of the exclusive right of publication, in the motion picture, from the applicable 
deposit requirements for the motion picture. 
(12) Motion pictures that consist of television transmission programs and that 
have been published, if at all, only by reason of a license or other grant to a 
nonprofit institution of the right to make a fixation of such programs directly 
from a transmission to the public, with or without the right to make further 
uses of such fixations. 
 223. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 7.17(C)(3) (citing H.R. REP. 94-1476, 
at 150 (1976)). 
 224. 139 CONG. REC. E337 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1993) (statement of Rep. Hughes). 
 225. Id. 
 226. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2018). 
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categories of works are now excluded from mandatory deposit under Section 
407,227 these deposit exemptions do not apply to works for which federal 
copyright registration is sought under Section 408.  While one might claim 
this is a clear area in which removal of Section 411(a)’s registration 
prerequisite may have a direct effect on the scope and breadth of the Library 
of Congress’ collections, this is unlikely to be the case.  First, “the 
fundamental criteria governing regulations issued under section 407(c), which 
allows exemptions from the deposit requirements for certain categories of 
works, [are] the needs and wants of the Library.”228  Quite simply, those 
excluded are not the type of works likely to be chosen for inclusion in any 
Library of Congress collection.229   
Furthermore, works that would otherwise be subject to mandatory 
deposit but for fulfillment through the federal copyright application process 
under Section 408 still may not be especially helpful or insightful.  The 
following Congressional testimony from an attorney for a large computer 
software manufacturer is illustrative:   
In our particular industry, we don’t believe that the current deposit 
requirements are assisting the Library in maintaining its collections.  
The deposit requirements require us only to submit approximately 75 
pages of what’s called source code that for lack of a better word would 
appear to you as gobbledy-gook.  It’s a page of symbols, letters, 
numbers that are unintelligible to anyone but software engineers.  
When you take into account that products in the market today may 
include over a million lines of this code, submitting 75 pages of that 
code does nothing to enhance the collections of the Library of 
Congress.230 
But it is not just deposits of computer programs that are of questionable 
utility.  Many other types of works are likely to be of little or no value to the 
Library of Congress.  Nonetheless, copies must still be deposited in order to 
obtain a federal registration and ultimately to permit timely enforcement of 
one’s rights in the event of copyright infringement.  The futility of this 
situation was well-described back in 1993 by Olan Mills II, in connection with 
 
 227. See supra Section IV.A.2.i. (discussing the extensive exemptions under 
Section 407).  
 228. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 151 (1976). 
 229. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 7.17(C)(3) (citing H.R. REP. 94-
1476, at 151 (1976)). 
 230. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 102–03 (testimony of 
Enid Greene Waldholtz, Corporate Counsel, Novell, Inc.).  Today, the number of 
pages of source code that must generally be submitted is 50. 37 C.F.R. § 
202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A)(1) (2019).  This includes the first twenty-five pages and the last 
twenty-five pages plus “the page of the source code that contains the copyright notice 
(if any).” Id. 
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a Senate Hearing considering legislation to repeal Section 411(a),231 but it still 
rings true today: 
I am told that the Library of Congress has expressed a concern that 
repeal of [Section 411(a)] would deprive it of its ability to obtain 
materials for its collections.  I do not understand this concern.  Several 
years ago, our lawyer called the Copyright Office to ask whether we 
should deposit copies of our output.  We were advised quite clearly 
that hundreds of thousands of Olan Mills photographs were not 
wanted.  The message was in essence, “don’t call us, we’ll call you.” 
No one ever has.  Olan Mills, Inc. (and I suspect most responsible 
businesses) will provide the Library of Congress with any copies of 
works that it wants.  But we should not be required to flood it with 
hundreds of thousands of portraits of no general interest to anyone.  
Nor should we be mired in paperwork intended to facilitate such a 
wasteful exercise.232 
Objections of this kind to the Copyright Act’s current deposit 
requirements are further amplified by the fact that the Library of Congress is 
not required to add materials deposited under Section 408 to its collections 
and can even be destroyed in accordance with Section 704, as discussed in 
more detail in the next subsection.   
iii.  Section 704:  Deposit and Destroy 
Whether copies of works are submitted to the Copyright Office in 
accordance with Section 407 or Section 408, the Copyright Act makes clear 
that all materials deposited become the property of the United States, even 
those works for which copyright registration is denied.233  Nonetheless, 
despite the contention such materials are critical to the continued expansion 
of the Library of Congress’ holdings, there is no requirement the works 
actually be added to any of the Library’s collections.234  This is due to the fact 
that Section 704 of the Copyright Act provides the Library of Congress with 
the authority to decide which materials it wants to include in, or alternatively 
exclude from, its collections.235   
Deposits rejected by the Library of Congress are placed in government 
storage facilities or otherwise retained under the control of the Copyright 
Office.236  Pursuant to Section 704, material deposited in connection with an 
unpublished work must be preserved for the full duration of its copyright term, 
 
 231. See supra Section II.C. (reviewing the proposed Copyright Reform Act of 
1993). 
 232. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 181 (statement of Olan 
Mills, II, Chairman of the Board, Olan Mills, Inc.). 
 233. 17 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2018). 
 234. §§ 704(b), (d); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 7.17(A). 
 235. §§ 704(b), (d). 
 236. § 704(d). 
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while published works are to be held “for the longest period considered 
practicable and desirable.”237  When the 1976 Copyright Act was initially 
passed, the Copyright Office did not have any stated limits on the length of 
time published works would be held under this statutory provision.  However, 
in 1983, a new policy was issued by the Copyright Office and approved by 
the Librarian of Congress due to stated concerns regarding overall storage 
space limitations and its related statutory obligations to retain unpublished 
deposits for the term of the copyright.238  Consequently, the revised retention 
schedule calls for maintaining published deposits for a period of only five 
years.239  After this time not only is there is no further obligation to preserve 
these works, but the Register of Copyright or the Librarian of Congress can 
order the works to be discarded in accordance with Section 704(d).240  Clearly, 
it is difficult to argue these deposit materials are vital to the continued 
expansion of the Library of Congress collections. 
iv.  Arguable Inequities Associated with “Library Building” 
Despite the discussion above concerning the perceived or actual loss that 
could potentially occur through the repeal of Section 411(a), there still exists 
the fundamental question of whether it is even proper to tie the deposit 
requirement to the copyright registration process.  This is especially true 
because registration with the accompanying deposit as part of the application 
is a mandatory step to the enforcement of one’s copyright in a given work at 
present.  The statement of the Business Software Alliance submitted in 
connection with Senate hearings on the registration prerequisite reflects part 
of this debate: 
Mandatory registration is not necessary or appropriate as a means of 
building the Library’s collections…There [is] a strong consensus that 
Library acquisitions policy should not drive copyright registration 
policy.  In addition, the requirement that copyright registrants give up 
copies of their works to the Library without compensation constitutes 
a burden imposed on authors which is unrelated with the purpose of 
the copyright system as provided in Article I, Section 2 of the 
Constitution, to “promote progress of science and the useful arts, by 
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights 
to their respective writings and discoveries.241 
 
 237. Id. 
 238. Policy Statement on Deposit Retention Schedule, 48 Fed. Reg. 12,862 (Mar. 
28, 1983); see also 139 CONG. REC. E337 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1993) (statement of Rep. 
Hughes). 
 239. 48 Fed. Reg. 12, 862 (Mar. 28, 1983). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 178 (Statement of the 
Business Software Alliance).  
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Moreover, the Senate testimony of an individual artist further echoes and 
expands on these concerns: 
As American creators, we wish, of course, to have the richest possible 
national library.  But we see no reason to link the deposit of works in 
the Library of Congress with copyright enforcement.  Our copyright 
law provides authors with an incentive to create by granting us 
exclusive rights to license our words.  Our ability to enforce these 
rights, essential to making a living for us, should not be tied to the great 
and worthy good of creating and maintaining a great national 
library.242 
There are no easy answers to the issue of how best to balance the 
responsibilities and burdens associated with building a strong Library of 
Congress.  However, removing the Section 411(a) registration prerequisite 
would likely be a good start.  By doing so, those who wish to take advantage 
of the benefits of registration could weigh the pros and cons of doing so with 
the related costs of providing the required deposit copies and paying the filing 
fee, not to mention the time connected with such endeavors.  But the ability 
to enforce one’s copyright in the federal court system would no longer be 
connected to registration of the work with the Copyright Office and the 
attendant costs of the application process.  Additionally, such an approach 
would be more in line with the policies of other nations.243  While some have 
suggested additional congressional appropriations to fund the purchase of 
materials for the Library of Congress,244 this is unlikely to be a viable solution 
in light of the current economic and political situation in the United States. 
B.  Copyright Office as “Gatekeeper” 
Another principal argument in opposition to the repeal of Section 411(a) 
is the purported role it plays in preventing dubious copyright infringement 
claims from entering the courthouse.  The following is representative of this 
line of reasoning: 
 
 242. Id. at 49 (Statement of Erica Jong). 
 243. Id. at 73 (Statement of Irwin Karp, Committee for Literary Property Studies: 
“[N]o other nation in the world that has a copyright law, and many have brilliant and 
formidable national libraries, none of them coerce depositing by requiring registration 
as a condition for remedies.  In fact, none of them have registration systems. We are 
the only people in the world that continue to impose these formalities.”); Id. at 5 
(Comments of Senator DeConcini: “The time has come for the Library to move in the 
direction of the legal deposit systems upon which the national library systems of most 
other countries are based.”).  
 244. See e.g., id. at 4–5 (Comments of Senator DeConcini: “We therefore propose 
that first, Congress accept a comprehensive package of recommendations supporting 
deposit acquisitions for the Library and the copyright registration system. This 
package should be enacted as a whole and adequately funded and staffed if there are 
to be changes in the copyright registration system.”). 
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In the past, some suits have been kept out of court by the necessity of 
filing for registration prior to institution of litigation and by the 
unwillingness of potential plaintiffs to bring suit under section 411(a) 
following a refusal to register because of the unfavorable light in 
which a judge might view the refusal to register and the undesirability 
of having the Copyright Office intervene in opposition.  In a world 
without section 411(a), it is likely that a greater number of suits would 
be brought in Federal court.  It certainly is no answer to permit the 
Copyright Office to intervene in such suits.  The Office should not be 
forced into devoting (as would be the case) a substantial part of its 
limited resources to litigation.245 
While at first glance such sentiments might appear to be compelling, 
further examination reveals a lack of evidentiary support for these claims.  
Studies show over the last several decades, the Copyright Office receives on 
average approximately 500,000 applications for registration each year246 and 
typically registers between 98–99% of the works submitted for federal 
copyright registration.247  Such statistics prompted one commentator to aptly 
state: “It makes little sense to delay all cases for the sake of the 1 percent.”248   
Additionally, in light of the fact that each year only about 2000 copyright 
infringement lawsuits are filed, it is highly unlikely the elimination of the 
registration prerequisite would have any significant effect on court dockets.249  
In fact, data provided by the Copyright Office during a five-year period 
reveals that “a total of thirteen infringement actions were filed . . . by 
copyright claimants whose registration applications had been refused.”250  
This suggests the repeal of Section 411(a) would increase the number of 
infringement cases filed by only “two or three per annum.”251  This hardly 
presupposes a reasonable likelihood of a “flood” of litigation. 
Moreover, as indicated above,252 Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act 
expressly allows an applicant to proceed with a copyright infringement action 
even after a refusal by the Register of Copyrights to register a work.253  
Consequently, the deterrent effect of Section 411(a) is exceptionally 
 
 245. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 43 (1988). 
 246. See e.g., UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORTS,   
available at https://www.copyright.gov/history/annual_reports.html [perma.cc/65XM 
-3BDN] (last visited May 9, 2020) (providing access to every annual report issued by 
the Copyright Office since 1866). 
 247. Brief of the United States at 4 n.2, Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 
(2010); see also, NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 7.16. 
 248. Id. at § 7.16 n.196. 
 249. Id. 
 250. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 21 (1988). 
 251. Id. 
 252. See supra Section II.A. 
 253. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018). 
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limited,254 especially when the high registration rate and the small number of 
actual cases filed are taken into consideration.  Add to the calculation the 
ability of courts to sanction plaintiffs who bring meritless claims, including in 
copyright infringement cases the award of a defendant’s attorney’s fees, and 
this further lessens the forcefulness of the argument Section 411(a) is 
necessary to prevent frivolous litigation.255 
Nonetheless, one ostensible advantage of the current system is that prior 
to filing a copyright infringement suit on a work denied registration, the 
applicant is required to serve notice on the Register of Copyrights and provide 
a copy of the complaint.256  Additionally, pursuant to Section 411(a) of the 
Copyright Act, the Register then has the “option [to] become a party to the 
action with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim by 
entering an appearance within sixty days after such service.”257  If litigants 
were allowed to proceed without first registering their work, the Register of 
Copyrights would not be apprised of an infringement suit in a manner similar 
to rejected applicants under the current law.  Although this would only affect 
the exceptionally small percentage of works the Register has historically 
refused to register, it may appear to be a potentially valid concern.  However, 
Section 508 of the Copyright Act ensures the Register of Copyrights will still 
be apprised of the suit.258  The provision requires clerks of the courts of the 
United States to send “[w]ithin one month after the filing of any action under 
this title . . . the names and addresses of the parties and the title, author, and 
registration number of each work involved in the action.”259  Alternatively, in 
the unlikely event that reliance on Section 508 proved to be onerous or 
inadequate, the issue could be easily resolved by requiring any party filing a 
copyright infringement without the benefit of a copyright registration to serve 
notice on the Register of Copyrights in the manner currently required under 
Section 411(a) for applicants denied registration.  
 
 254. 139 CONG. REC. E337 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1993) (statement of Rep. Hughes) 
(“[I]t is argued that section 411(a) weeds out frivolous claims. The problem with this 
argument is that section 411(a) permits claimants to file suit after a rejection. Thus, at 
most, section 411(a) deters only the assertion of frivolous claims by those who are not 
sufficiently determined to bring suit after a rejection.”). 
 255. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 116 (prepared statement 
of Paul Batista, Executive Director of the Graphic Artists Guild, Inc.) (“There is no 
merit to the suggestion that repeal of [Section 411(a)] will lead to an increase in 
frivolous or harassing litigation. No small business person can risk valuable time and 
resources pursuing a meritless infringement claim . . . .  Furthermore, any plaintiff 
asserting a frivolous or harassing claim in court would face the prospect of paying the 
defendant’s attorney’s fees under Section 505.  The courts have the power and 
discretion to protect defendants from meritless claims, and they have not hesitated to 
use that authority to sanction copyright plaintiffs where appropriate in the past.”). 
 256. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018); see also supra Section II.A. discussing the 
addition of this portion of the provision. 
 257. § 411(a). 
 258. § 508. 
 259. Id.; see also, e.g., S. REP. No. 100-352, at 25 n.7 (1988). 
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Aside from keeping out baseless claims and ensuring the Register of 
Copyrights receives notice of pending copyright infringement cases, 
proponents of Section 411(a) often argue the registration prerequisite also 
streamlines the litigation process itself.  For example, former Register of 
Copyrights Ralph Oman has stated that “the requirement of registration as a 
precondition of an infringement suit simplifies and expedites litigation . . . 
[and] its elimination will be burdensome to the federal courts.”260  However, 
the strength of this position is dramatically lessened by changes to copyright 
law that have occurred over time.261  Modifications such as “the repeal of 
mandatory formalities and the expansion of copyrightable subject” have 
largely eradicated the force of any arguable screening function provided by 
the Copyright Office.262   
Furthermore, “Review of judicial opinions in infringement cases 
suggests that courts largely make independent evaluations of issues of fact 
and copyright validity rather than relying on certificates of registration.”263  In 
many ways, this is not very surprising as Congress vested the federal courts 
with the power to enforce copyright law, not the Copyright Office.264  As the 
Ninth Circuit aptly stated, “the Register’s decision of whether or not to grant 
a registration certificate is largely perfunctory”265 as the Register’s review is 
limited to only determining whether “the material deposited is ‘copyrightable 
subject matter’ and that the legal and formal requirements of the Copyright 
Act are met.”266  Although a timely registration certificate provides prima 
facie evidence of the validity of copyrightability and the facts contained 
therein,267 it is ultimately the role of the courts to determine these issues.268  
 
 260. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 23 (1988). 
 261. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 30. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. See e.g., S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 24 (1988) (“[I]t is the courts, not the 
Copyright Office, that interpret and apply the copyright law to disputes arising from 
alleged infringements. While Congress could have chosen to give the Copyright 
Office the power to conduct administrative proceedings to decide such disputes, it has 
never done so.  Rather, it has assigned that role to the courts, in adversary proceedings 
in which one party shoulders the burden of proving his entitlement to relief.”). 
 265. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 266. Id. at 621 n.13 (“After the Register’s determination, the courts are 
empowered to review any denial of a certificate, and approval by the Register gives 
an applicant only prima facie evidence of copyright, leaving the courts to make the 
ultimate determination in either instance.”). 
 267. 17 U.S.C § 410(c) (2018); see also supra Section IV.A.1.i (discussing prima 
facie validity). 
 268. See e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 12.11(B)(3) (“Some courts, 
even in infringement cases, although typically not expressing themselves in such 
language, apparently defer to Copyright Office determinations of copyrightability 
through issuance of a registration certificate.  A few expressly take the determination 
into their own hands.  The most common pattern, however, is for courts adjudicating 
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Moreover, courts are in no way constrained by the earlier determinations of 
the Copyright Office’s decision to approve or deny registration of the work in 
question.269  Consequently, the repeal of Section 411(a)’s registration 
requirement is not only unlikely to create additional burdens on the court 
system, but it would also have little to no impact on judicial practices in 
copyright infringement actions. 
C.  Independent Justifications for the Elimination of Section 411(a)’s 
Registration Requirement 
Aside from the numerous deficiencies in the claims advanced by 
proponents of Section 411(a) examined above, there are a few additional 
rationales for repealing the prerequisite of federal copyright registration prior 
to bringing a copyright infringement suit.  First, dispensing with this portion 
of Section 411(a) would allow individuals and entities to seek relief for 
copyright infringement more expediently.  This is particularly important 
considering the continual technological advancements that have made the 
reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works less costly and much 
easier.  Second, the prerequisite is incongruent with the goal of global 
harmonization, which has repeatedly been the motivation for so many of the 
changes to domestic copyright law over the years.  Moreover, the dual 
treatment of U.S. and foreign works is also internally inconsistent and 
similarly untenable.  Maintaining a registration prerequisite for owners of U.S. 
works conflicts with the general movement toward harmonization as the 
United States essentially stands alone on this requirement.  Third, Section 
411(a) creates a peculiar inconsistency between copyright and trademark law, 
which is arguably problematic due to the overlap between these two areas of 
law and the frequency with which a single complaint includes claims for both 
types of infringement. 
1.  Copyright Enforcement 
Long gone are the days when an actual, tangible book needs to be 
obtained and each page individually photocopied to reproduce the work, a 
floppy disk acquired to download and duplicate a computer program, or a CD 
attained to replicate an album.  Instead, a perfect copy can be made quickly 
 
infringement actions simply to reach their own determinations, without adverting 
either to the agency’s general level of expertise or to the Copyright Office’s particular 
determination via its issuance (or denial) of a certificate.”) (citing I.C. ex rel. Solovsky 
v. Delta Galil USA, 135 F. Supp. 3d 196, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). 
 269. See e.g., S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 24 (1988) (“[U]nder current law, the courts 
are already required to undertake an independent determination of copyrightability. 
Courts can – and do – decide that, despite the issuance of a registration certificate, the 
plaintiff is not entitled to claim the protection of the copyright laws, just as they can – 
and do – decide that the Office’s refusal to issue a registration certificate does not 
foreclose the plaintiff from proving that the work is copyrightable.”). 
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and easily disseminated around the world almost instantaneously.  
Additionally, widespread reproductions of copyrighted works can often be 
completed on a large-scale at very little cost as a result of extensive 
technological advancements.  Consequently, expeditious access to the courts 
to remedy infringements has become essential. 
One of the benefits and leading rationales for many courts that adopted 
the application approach270 was that it avoided “unnecessary delay in 
copyright infringement litigation, which could permit an infringing party to 
continue to profit from its wrongful acts.”271  As a result of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Fourth Estate, copyright owners that may not have 
registered their work prior to the acts of infringement272 are once again thrown 
into a “legal limbo” in which they have copyright protection but no means to 
timely enforce such rights.273  As even the Supreme Court noted in its Fourth 
Estate decision, the registration process is far from prompt.  The Court 
observed that while copyright registration processing times used to be from 
one to two weeks in the 1950s,274 today it takes on average seven months.275  
As such, the Court acknowledged the “statutory scheme has not worked as 
Congress likely envisioned.”276  The Court also noted these delays were 
largely attributable “to staffing and budgetary shortages” that Congress cannot 
cure.277  Nevertheless, while the Court described the situation as 
“unfortunate,” it also held this “factor does not allow us to revise § 411(a)’s 
congressionally composed text.”278 
The Court provided a somewhat conciliatory suggestion, namely 
utilizing the Copyright Office’s expedited claims service.279  In circumstances 
such as pending or prospective litigation, the Copyright Office does allow 
copyright claimants to request special handling that typically provides a very 
quick turnaround, usually no more than five working days.280  Unfortunately, 
the option of expediting an application is not a real solution to the problem, 
as it comes at a prohibitively high price for many – an additional $800 fee per 
 
 270. See supra Section III.A (examining the application approach in detail). 
 271. Cosmetic Ideas Inc., 606 F.3d at 619. 
 272. See supra Section II.C (discussing some of the practical and financial 
impediments to copyright registration). 
 273. See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620 (“The application approach avoids this 
legal limbo – and avoids prolonging the period of infringement – by allowing a litigant 
to proceed with an infringement suit as soon as he has taken all of the necessary steps 
to register the copyright at issue.”). 
 274. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 
886 (2019). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 892.   
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 892 n.6.  
 280. Id. 
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work;281 plus there is no guarantee the application will be processed in such 
an accelerated manner.  One commentator appropriately characterized this 
“alternative” as follows:   
[F]ew copyright claimants are aware of the expedited procedure; the 
procedure itself is costly; and, even if pursued, the expedited procedure 
does not ensure the prompt issuance or denial of a certificate if the 
Copyright Office chooses to engage in protracted correspondence with 
the applicant before definitively accepting or rejecting the 
application.282 
Furthermore, the expedited process doesn’t solve the more fundamental 
problem faced by all copyright owners of domestic works, namely an inability 
to obtain prompt and equal access to the federal court system, especially when 
preliminary relief may be warranted. 
Section 502 of the Copyright Act provides for “temporary and final 
injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain 
infringement of a copyright.”283  Such relief may be particularly important in 
clear cases of piracy or situations where it might be especially difficult to 
ascertain the full extent of copying, thereby making it all but impossible to 
determine an appropriate monetary damage award.284  Moreover, in some 
instances, an injunction is even more valuable to a copyright owner than any 
sort of financial remuneration for losses incurred from the infringement.285  
This is attributable to the fact that “[t]he exigencies of copyright litigation 
often require the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order, 
followed by a temporary injunction, upon the discovery of an infringing 
copy.”286  Of course, injunctive relief is not appropriate in every copyright 
infringement case.  It is exceptionally important that other factors be 
considered, most notably the potential existence of fair use, the possible 
conflict with the First Amendment, and the impact on the public domain.287  
Nonetheless, “Issuance of injunctive relief is a long-standing remedy in U.S. 
 
 281. Id. 
 282. See Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 185 (Draft Working 
Paper of Paul L. Goldstein, Professor, Stanford Law School). 
 283. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2018). 
 284. See Pamela Samuelson & Members of the CPP, The Copyright Principles 
Project:  Directions for Reform 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1223–24 (2010). 
 285. See e.g., La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 
1199–1200 (Stating that in terms of remedies available under the Copyright Act, 
“perhaps most important, a registrant can obtain an injunction against an infringer.”). 
 286. See Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 185 (Draft Working 
Paper of Paul L. Goldstein, Professor, Stanford Law School). 
 287. See Samuelson et al., supra note 284, at 1223–24; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra 
note 98, § 14.06(A)(1)(c); Richard Dannay, Copyright Injunctions and Fair Use: 
Enter eBay – Four-Factor Fatigue or Four-Factor Freedom, 55 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 449, 460 (2008). 
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copyright law, and that is as it should be.”288  But for U.S. copyright owners 
that discover their work has been infringed prior to registration, they cannot 
immediately gain access to the courthouse due to the registration prerequisite.  
Furthermore, absent repeal of Section 411(a)’s stipulation, the attendant wait 
associated with the registration process and the inability to obtain a 
preliminary injunction may make it impossible to achieve fair remuneration 
for the harms suffered, as “justice delayed will often mean justice denied.”289   
2.  Inconsistencies:  Inside and Out 
As previously discussed,290 in order to become a member of the Berne 
Convention, the United States was required to amend its copyright laws to 
remove all prohibited formalities against nationals from other Berne 
Convention member nations, including Section 411(a)’s registration 
prerequisite.  However, due to a peculiarity of the Berne Convention,291 there 
is no such requirement that U.S. nationals be treated as favorably.292  
Consequently, while an owner of a foreign work can bring a copyright 
infringement suit immediately, an owner of a U.S. work must not only apply 
for federal registration but, following the Fourth Estate case, must actually 
wait until the Copyright Office has determined whether or not the work is 
entitled to registration.  At the time, Congress could have removed the 
precondition of registration for all copyright owners but ultimately decided 
against this course of action. 
As such, owners of U.S. works shoulder the burdens and harms 
associated with Section 411(a)’s requirement.  Perhaps not surprisingly, this 
bifurcated approach has been described as “demoralizing” and 
“discriminatory.”293  Moreover, this incongruous differentiation between 
domestic and international works may put U.S. copyright owners at a 
 
 288. Samuelson et al., supra note 284, at 1223.   
 289. See Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 64, at 185 (Draft Working 
Paper of Paul L. Goldstein, Professor, Stanford Law School). 
 290. See supra Section II.B. (Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988); see 
also supra Section II.C. (Copyright Reform Act of 1993). 
 291. See e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, §17.01 (B)(1)(a) (“[T]he 
Convention does not purport to govern the scope of formalities that a country may 
place on its own nationals to secure copyright protection.”) (citing Berne Convention 
(Paris text), art. 5(1) (“Authors shall enjoy . . . in countries of the Union other than the 
country of origin . . . .”)).  
 292. See Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 186–87 (Draft 
Working Paper of Paul L. Goldstein, Professor, Stanford Law School); id. at 30 
(Report of Co-Chairs Barbara Ringer and Robert Wedgeworth, Library of Congress 
Advisory Committee on Copyright Registration and Deposit). 
 293. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 176, 187 (Draft Working 
Paper of Paul L. Goldstein, Professor, Stanford Law School). 
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competitive disadvantage294 without any “real countervailing benefits to the 
United States copyright system.”295  
The dual standard is particularly untenable given the purposeful 
movement of U.S. copyright law toward increasing international 
harmonization over the past fifty years.  For example, many of the revisions 
made as part of the 1976 Copyright Act296 and the Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1988297 were designed to position “American 
copyright law on a footing similar to most other countries, especially in the 
industrial world” and as a result “our domestic law as well as the international 
legal system [would be] improved.”298  Relatedly, in 1998, the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”) was enacted, which, among other 
things, extended the duration of copyright protection in the United States by 
twenty years.299  As a result, a work created today by an individual artist is 
granted a copyright term of the life of the author plus seventy years, as 
opposed to the previous length of life of the author plus fifty years.300  
Proponents of the CTEA greatly emphasized the need to harmonize U.S. law 
with a similar change made in the European Union a few years earlier.301   
It is worth noting the requirement of registration prior to instituting suit 
cannot be attributed to harmonization as it was atypical of other countries’ 
copyright laws prior to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976 and 
continues to be so today.  Elimination of the registration requirement for all is 
therefore necessary to equalize the current imbalance in the treatment of U.S. 
copyright owners.  Such a change would also result in the United States finally 
becoming aligned with international law on this issue.  Consequently, the 
United States would no longer stand out as an anomaly, something domestic 
copyright law has ostensibly tried to avoid over the last five decades.  
3.  Intersection Between Trademarks and Copyrights 
While copyright law and trademark law are distinct areas of intellectual 
property law, there is a significant overlap between the two.  Unlike patent 
law which requires a determination by the United States Patent and Trademark 
 
 294. Id. at 176 (Statement of the Business Software Alliance). 
 295. Id. at 185 (Draft Working Paper of Paul L. Goldstein, Professor, Stanford 
Law School). 
 296. See supra Section II.A (Promulgating Section 411(a) of the 1976 Copyright 
Act). 
 297. See supra Section II.B (Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988). 
 298. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 7 (1988). 
 299. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 
2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).  
 300. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2018) (“Duration of copyright: Works created on or after 
January 1, 1978”). 
 301. Council of the European Communities, Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 
October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, (1993) 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/1993/98/oj [perma.cc/77UB-9E7C]. 
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Office (“USPTO”) that the property is protectable prior to a grant of rights,302 
copyright law and trademark law do not require such a determination.  A 
trademark is potentially protectable once it is used in commerce in connection 
with the sale of the goods or services.303  Although there are clear benefits 
from federal trademark registration, it is by no means required.  As such, if a 
trademark owner discovers the mark has been infringed, a trademark 
infringement claim can be filed immediately in federal court.304  In other 
words, there is no need to wait for the USPTO to pass on the sufficiency and 
protectability of the mark at issue prior to instituting a lawsuit. 
Furthermore, as the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear, the mere fact 
that a work is protectable under one area of intellectual property law does not 
preclude protection under another area.305  It is not uncommon, “especially 
with respect to logos,” for a “given work to be protected by independent 
copyright and trademark rights.”306  However, if the work has not been 
previously registered under copyright law, the owner can only proceed with 
the trademark claim.  Consequently, even if it would have been otherwise 
warranted, the delay will likely result in a “forfeit[ure of] the right to an 
immediate temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief” on the 
copyright claim.307  While this predicament may not be a sufficient reason to 
amend Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act, it is yet another example of the 
many shortcomings associated with the registration prerequisite.   
D.  Formalities: Back to the Future 
Despite the historic shift away from formalities as a result of the global 
harmonization of copyright law generally and U.S. movement toward 
accession to membership in the Berne Convention specifically, there has been 
a contemporary push for their reintroduction.  While a comprehensive review 
of the academic literature advocating for the reestablishment of various types 
of copyright formalities and rationales for their use is beyond the scope of this 
 
 302. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq. (2018) (“Inventions patentable”). 
 303. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2018) (“False designation of origin, false descriptions, 
and dilution forbidden”). 
 304. Id.  
 305. See e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (“We do hold that the 
patentability of the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, does not bar copyright as 
works of art.  Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing is 
patentable it may not be copyrighted.”); see also INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, Board 
Resolutions: Copyright Registration as a Precondition of Infringement Suit,  
https://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Pages/BR20171107.aspx [perma.cc/G9HA-NVD5] 
(last accessed June 12, 2019) (citing 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6.5 (4th ed. 2016) (“The courts have 
generally held that patent, trademark and copyright are separate and independent 
forms of protection.  As a general principle, the presence or absence of one does not 
automatically preclude protection under another.”). 
 306. INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, supra note 305. 
 307. Id. 
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Article, an examination of the primary arguments put forth for a renewed 
emphasis on the requirement of registration is particularly relevant.  Although 
many of the concerns raised are valid, conditioning copyright rights on 
registration, at least in its current form, is imprudent. 
Much of the ardor for the return of formalities, especially the 
requirement of registration, is due in large part to the significant increase in 
both the breadth and length of copyright rights which is heightened by the 
earlier shift in copyright law to an “automatic protection regime.”308  As one 
scholar noted, “[c]opyright has historically been a limited right.  Yet today 
these limits have expanded to an unprecedented scope.”309  Relatedly, a report 
issued by the Copyright Principles Project (“CPP”), a group made up of law 
professors and lawyers from both private practices and within the copyright 
industry, maintained that “the duration of copyright nowadays is longer than 
is needed to achieve the normative goals of a good copyright regime” and 
“[t]he switch to a life-plus-years model and the twenty-year extension have 
contributed” to a number of growing problems.310   
Among the cited complications engendered by these changes is the issue 
of so-called “orphan works.”  As the CPP report explained, “those wishing to 
license older works often cannot locate the rights holders even after a 
reasonably diligent search” which “inhibits appropriate reuses of older works 
that may be important to preserve as part of our cultural heritage.”311  
Similarly, even for modern works, “there is no simple way to distinguish 
between those works whose authors care about copyright protection and those 
who do not” as rights attach for all copyrightable works immediately upon 
creation.312  As a result of these developments, scholars have understandably 
raised concerns about the imbalance this has produced between the public 
interest and the rights of copyright owners.  In doing so, many have also 
credited formalities with previously preventing or at least lessening such 
harms arising from current copyright policy.313   
For instance, as one commentator observed, “[f]or nearly two centuries, 
U.S. copyright law relied on statutory formalities,” including filing a 
registration with the government, in an attempt to create balance.314  The CPP 
report similarly noted that registration “made it relatively simple for persons 
who were interested in licensing certain uses of protected works to check the 
central registry for contact information about the copyright owners.”315  
 
 308. Samuelson et al., supra note 284, at 1186. 
 309. Reid, supra note 18, at 427. 
 310. Samuelson et al., supra note 284, at 1185. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 1198. 
 313. Reid, supra note 18, at 427; see also, e.g., Samuelson et al., supra note 284, 
at 1185–87; Carroll, supra note 18, at 1511; Daniel Gervais & Dashiell Renaud, The 
Future of United States Copyright Formalities: Why We Should Prioritize 
Recordation, and How To Do It, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1459 (2013). 
 314. Reid, supra note 18, at 427. 
 315. Samuelson et al., supra note 284, at 1186. 
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Additionally, the CPP report cautioned that as a result of this 
“deformalization,” potentially beneficial reuses of many copyrighted works 
are inhibited.316  Consequently, the CPP report proffered “a more robust 
registration system” and a “‘reformalizing’ [of] copyright law.”317 
While none of the various proposals to “re-incentivize” registration 
suggested a return to the strict rules of the past which could easily lead to a 
work falling into the public domain for even a minor error or omission, all of 
them included the loss of certain rights or provided additional defenses to the 
alleged infringer for failing to register the work at issue.318  For example, the 
CPP report suggested that infringement could “be found for copying of non-
literal elements of registered works but not for such copying as to unregistered 
works.”319  Relatedly, “[r]egistered rights holders might also be able to sue to 
stop certain non-commercial exploitations of a work likely to have market 
impairing effects,”320 while unregistered works would only be protected from 
“exact or near-exact that would cause commercial harm.”321  Furthermore, fair 
uses could be defined differently as between registered and unregistered 
works, with the latter more broadly construed.322  Other scholars have 
suggested alternative approaches, including allowing users of an unregistered 
work “to rely on an innocent infringer defense when facing a claim for 
infringement.”323 
Although the goal of ensuring there are “reasonable ways for the public 
to get information about who owns which rights in which works and whether 
works are or are not available for use or are in the public domain,”324 is both 
a laudable and imperative objective, achieving it through the formality of 
federal registration and a threat of limited enforcement is problematic.  As 
earlier discussed in great detail, there are numerous barriers to registration in 
its current form, especially for individual artists or smaller entities.  One 
scholar fittingly described the effect of such formalities as “shield[ing] large 
copyright owners who routinely comply with formalities from the 
infringement claims of smaller copyright owners, particularly individual 
authors, who may lack the information or resources systematically to register 
and deposit their works.”325  Additionally, for those creating numerous works 
in a short period of time, the ability to identify which ones could be 
commercially successful and warrant a copyright registration prior to 
infringement is virtually impossible to predict.  While at some point in the 
future we might have the ability to simply and quickly federally register a 
 
 316. Id. at 1198. 
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 319. Id. at 1201. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 1200. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Reid, supra note 18, at 428.  
 324. Samuelson et al., supra note 284, at 1186. 
 325. Ginsburg, supra note 18, at 314.  
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copyrightable work, or alternatively place all relevant information about it in 
a publicly accessible database, we are unfortunately not quite there yet.326  In 
the meantime, the use of such copyright registration formalities should at least 
for now remain a thing of the past. 
  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Fourth Estate Public Benefit 
Corporation v. Wall-Street.com, LLC goes beyond merely settling the split 
among U.S. Courts of Appeals regarding the definition of registration for 
purposes of satisfying Section 411(a)’s precondition.  Instead, it should serve 
as a clarion call for a much-needed amendment to the Copyright Act.  By 
repealing the provision’s registration prerequisite, a U.S. copyright owner of 
an unregistered works will no longer be left with a right without a remedy.  
 
 
 326. See e.g., Carroll, supra note 18, at 1522 (2013) (“Digital technologies offer 
opportunities to make affixing notice to a work or registering an author’s claim to 
copyright in a database trivially easy in places with ready computer and Internet 
access.”).  
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